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Abstract 
This research provides an empirical analysis of the provision of compulsory 
education in the rural part of China and discusses a potential financing arrangement 
for compulsory education in the country. In China, the delivery and financing of 
basic education are primarily the responsibility of local governments, especially the 
lower-tier ones. Although localities differ substantially in economic conditions, there 
is a lack of need-based fiscal transfers from the higher-level governments. Spatial 
disparities in education expenditure and how the problem should be addressed to 
ensure universal basic education are subjects hotly discussed. In this connection, this 
thesis attempts to explore a number of issues. First, in contrast to existing studies 
which focus on disparities in education expenditure, our work employs such concepts 
as inter-jurisdictional cost differences and standard expenditure used in foreign 
studies to arrive at a measure "degree of provision" to indicate the extent to which 
localities spend above or below the price-adjusted standard total expenditure. The 
results derived paint a macro picture of inter-provincial and intra-provincial 
differences in education provision. Next, regression estimation identifies a number of 
factors including income, share of school-age population, school-age population 
density and locality types (mountainous, minority, poor) that are associated with 
variations in per-pupil education expenditure. Finally, considering the inadequacy of 
current education financing arrangement, simulation based on a hypothetical 
education transfer mechanism estimates the gap between price-adjusted standard 
total expenditure and fiscal capacity of localities. The estimated amount of funding is 
fairly large compared to the scale of existing transfers allocated for equalization 
purpose and those earmarked for basic education. Furthermore, the simulation results 



















教育轉移支付的需求並不局限於一個地區或個別省份。 • • 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, China has been working towards the universal 
implementation of nine-year compulsory education, a Herculean task given the large 
size of rural population and China's low level of economic development. However, 
financing compulsory education has mainly been the responsibility of lower-tier 
governments. The dysfunctional intergovernmental fiscal system has not adequately 
attended to the differences in local fiscal capacities for supporting education and 
other public services. This is not conducive to the development of education across 
the nation where localities differ significantly in economic conditions. As education 
expenditure usually makes up a preponderant share of the local budget, the financing 
of compulsory education affects not only the quality of education but also has 
implications for the financial burden on local governments. The issue of education 
finance, therefore, should not be overlooked. By using the education expenditure 
data and census data in the year 2000, this research constructs an index concerning 
the degree of education provision across counties. In addition, it takes a look at the 
factors that affect education expenditure. Last but not least, we also discuss an 
alternative education financing mechanism that hopefully can address the regional 
disparities in the supply of education. To better explain our motivations for the study, 
below we move on to an overview of the historical background of education 
financing and the fiscal system in China. The purpose and the structure of this 
research are laid out in the last subsection of this chapter. 
1 
1.1 History of education financing 
First of all, a review of the evolution of education policy on compulsory 
education in the reform era would enhance one's understanding of the current 
problems of China's education system. 
With the demise of the commune system and the establishment of township-
level governments\ the central government passed a decision in 1985 on reforming 
the education system. The document indicates that local governments are responsible 
for developing compulsory education. Except for the overall policy and macro 
planning to be determined by the central government, local governments have the 
authority and responsibility to plan and implement the specifics, and to manage the 
schools. The further division of responsibilities among the four tiers of local 
government is left with the provincial governments (Central Committee of the 
Communist Party 1985). 
With regard to the financing of local compulsory education, the document 
stipulates that local governments should invest suitable portions of local revenues in 
education. In particular, fiscal revenues accruing to the township level should be 
primarily spent on education. Since then, local governments have been permitted to 
collect education surcharges and other off-budget funds to supplement the budgetary 
resources for education. As a result of this reform decision, the administrative and 
financial responsibility for basic education has fallen ultimately on the township-
level governments. 
1 In China, there are five levels of governments. The central government, being the highest level, is 
followed by the provincial governments, prefectural governments, county-level governments, and 
township-level governments. 
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In 1994, another official document concerning the implementation of 
education reform and development was issued (State Council 1994). A noticeable 
change was the assignment of greater responsibility to the county-level governments 
for implementing compulsory education (Ma and Long 2000). As outlined in the 
document, county-level governments are responsible for managing the revenues put 
aside for education and coordinating the use of these resources. The salaries of state 
teachers and part of the salaries of community teachers 2 should be paid by the 
county-level budget. Counties are also asked to make arrangement for the funding of 
other operational expenditures and collaborate with other tiers of government on 
investment in school infrastructure. At the same time, the document states that 
township-level governments in more developed areas could participate in the 
management of education revenues. However, as pinpointed by Wong and others 
(2003), towns and townships including those in the poor regions have been the major 
contributors to the financing of basic education even after the release of the 1994 
document. 
In its latest documents regarding compulsory education and rural education, 
the State Council (2001a, 2002) again emphasizes the role of county-level 
governments in paying teachers and other employees on time. Moreover, it specifies 
that fiscal transfers from upper-tier governments should first be used to pay teachers 
and staff in the rural area. An apparent difference from the previous document is that 
the central government shows greater concern about the difficulties facing rural 
education and clearly requires the county-level governments to shoulder the major 
responsibility to finance compulsory education. 
2 Community teachers had been recruited because there were not enough state teachers (West 1997). • 
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As illustrated above, the burden of financing basic education has been borne 
by lower-tier governments. Although there is a recent shift in responsibilities away 
from the lowest tier, i.e., township-level governments to the county-level 
governments, researchers have pointed out that county-level governments are also 
challenged by mismatches of fiscal capacity and needs (Cheng and Xu 2001; Chen 
2003; Jia and Bai 2003). 
1.2 Fiscal system and the financing of rural education 
A closely related problem is the lack of a need-based intergovernmental 
transfer system. Local governments are responsible for large shares of public 
expenditures. Seventy percent of budgetary expenditure on basic education and about 
sixty percent of healthcare expenditure are financed by the county- and township-
level governments (Wong et al. 2003). But under the tax sharing system, the central 
government is entitled to a larger portion of tax revenues including the entire 
consumption tax and 75 percent of the value-added tax. Local governments, on the 
other hand, are assigned less buoyant taxes which have to be further divided among 
the four tiers of governments. There are wide differences in the abilities to finance 
public goods and services among localities. 
In principle intergovernmental transfers help ameliorate the gap between 
fiscal capacity and fiscal needs. However, the existing transfers in China's fiscal 
system do not adequately fulfill such a function. For example, tax rebate introduced 
by the 1994 tax reform is a measure that guarantees provinces to have revenue not 
less than the pre-reform level. In 1994, the amount of tax rebate to a province was 
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equaled to the reduction of local retained revenue due to the use of new system. 
Afterwards, a growth rate has been applied so that the tax rebate increases with 
consumption tax and value-added tax. For every 1-percent growth of the two taxes, 
tax rebate increases by 0.3 percent. As pointed out by researchers (Liu 2002; Yang 
2003), tax rebate protects the vested interests (especially the wealthier provinces). In 
fact, it has precluded significant amounts of fiscal transfers centralized by the central 
government from being distributed to reduce fiscal disparities. Notwithstanding a 
new intergovernmental transfer schemes launched in 1995 for the purpose of fiscal 
equalization, the amount of such equalizing transfers is limited and can only fill a 
small percentage of local fiscal gap. In 1999, the percentage was 6 percent for non-
minority provinces, and 10 to 18 percent for minority provinces (Ministry of Finance 
2000). Further, as these equalizing transfers are allocated to provincial governments, 
how they are then distributed among localities are subject to the policies of 
provincial and prefecutral governments. 
An outcome of the fiscal setting in China is that policy mandates are only 
partly funded or even unfunded. In the case of compulsory education, the central 
government set the universal enrolment policy but has offered small amounts of 
financial aid to help localities achieve the goal. It was not until 1996 that the central 
government began to allocate earmarked grants on a larger scale to assist the poor 
localities in implementing the policy. Nonetheless, the grants require matching funds 
from local governments and this has created problem in some localities. For example, 
in Hezheng County of Gansu, township-level governments have to provide for 41 
percent of the matching funds. As a result, part of the revenues originally set aside 
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for recurrent expenditure is diverted to make matching contribution (Wong et al. 
2003). 
Given the gap between fiscal revenues and expenditure responsibilities, many 
components of local public expenditure have been financed through various off-
budget channels. These off-budget sources consist of numerous surcharges, fees and 
self-raised funds collected by local governments and administrative agencies. At the 
township- and village-level, levies have been imposed on rural households and 
enterprises {santi wutong) to support a range of public services including education, 
birth control, military training, roads construction and maintenance, and other 
welfare expenditures. Off-budget revenues therefore form a non-trivial part of funds 
for rural public service provision. 
Table 1 illustrates the sources of revenues for compulsory education in rural 
China in the year 2000. Budgetary appropriations take up the largest share of revenue. 
They include government funding for operational and infrastructure expenditure. 
Another major source of revenue is education surcharges, which consist of urban 
education surcharges, rural education surcharges and local education surcharges. 
Urban education surcharges are imposed on organizations and individuals that pay 
value-added tax, business tax and consumption tax. They are collected at 3 percent of 
these taxes. Rural education surcharges are set as 1.5 to 2 percent of the net income 
of rural households in the previous year (Su 2002). They can also be remittances 
from rural enterprises. As for the local education surcharges, they include but are not 
limited to charging workers a percentage of their wages and collecting levies on 
banquets. Primary school and junior secondary school students are not required to 
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pay tuition fees but they pay miscellaneous fees (zafei)，which form an important 
channel of revenue for schools. Besides, schools may obtain income by owning 
businesses or providing social service. Donations come from domestic and overseas 
organizations and individuals. Self-raised funds are contributed by local community 
and they offer a source of finance for spending on infrastructure and equipment. The 
category "others" comprises unspecified fees collected from students and income 
from other channels. As reported in the table, most of the provinces in the eastern 
and central regions have greater reliance on off-budget revenues than their western 
counterparts. In many cases, over 30 percent of the revenues are not budgetary 
appropriations. 
The exceptionally low percentage for education surcharges in Anhui is due to 
the recent "tax-for-fee" reform�，which is in response to the heavy burden put on 
rural households. As some of the government officials are overzealous in meeting 
policy targets and some of them actively extract revenue to finance the expanding 
bureaucracy, rural households have experienced considerable burden of paying many 
different kinds of fees and charges (Guojia jiwei hongguan jingji yanjiuyuan ketizu 
2001). Under the reform, rural education surcharges and self-raised funds are 
abolished, and a revised agricultural tax collection method is put in place. While the 
reform is extending to other provinces, the central government has introduced a new 
transfer scheme that helps make up for the revenue losses due to the reform. Similar 
to the equalizing transfers mentioned earlier, this transfer arrangement addresses only 
part of the fiscal gap. The provincial, prefectural and county-level governments are 
asked to put aside funding for additional transfers to townships and villages. 
3 Anhui was the only province implementing a province-wide "tax-for-fee" reform in 2000. 
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1.3 Purpose of this study 
Against the above background, there has been continuous discussion on the 
problems and issues that confront the provision of compulsory education in China. A 
number of these studies are reviewed in the next chapter. With the use of county-
level data for the year 2000, this research conducts the analysis in a number of 
directions. First, an overall picture of disparities in education provision is presented. 
Second, regression is carried out to account for disparities in spending on education. 
Third, in view of the disparities, a financing scheme that aims to ensure a certain 
level of resources is considered. 
To give an overall picture of disparities, we take a different approach from 
the usual comparison of education expenditures. Considering that there exist inter-
area variations in the price of inputs, we derive an index of degree of provision by 
calculating the ratio of actual education expenditures to estimated standard 
expenditures adjusted for inter-provincial price differences. The index offers a 
measure of education provision across localities. Also, it allows us to figure out 
localities whose expenditures on compulsory education fall short of the benchmark 
expenditures, i.e., the price-adjusted standard expenditures. 
The index indicates that the degree of provision varies considerably across 
the nation. To explain the variations in investment made in education, regression 
estimation is pursued. In the regression analysis of per-pupil education expenditure, a 
number of variables exhibit significant coefficients. Among them are economic 
factor, demographic characteristics, geographical characteristics, and policy 
influence. The empirical findings suggest that changes to the existing education 
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financing arrangement would be needed so as to enhance the provision of education 
in rural China. 
As a policy suggestion, an education transfer mechanism based on a school 
aid formula in the United States is used to estimate the amount of funding needed to 
help localities attain the standard expenditure. Such an analysis is particularly 
important in light of the "tax-for-fee" reform introduced in the rural areas. Under the 
reform, education surcharges and self-raised funds are to be abolished. Without 
sufficient increase in revenue from the revised agricultural tax or financial assistance 
from upper-tier governments to make up for the revenue losses, the provision of 
education will suffer. Currently, emphasis is put on the on-time payment of teachers' 
salaries. However, for the long-term development of quality education, there is a 
heated discussion on the need of an education transfer mechanism taking account of 
expenditure needs and allocating funding to disadvantaged localities. Important such 
a matter may be, there has been little quantitative information on this issue. Hence, 
this research attempts to fill the gap. 
We do not intend to provide a definitive answer since the estimation of 
standard spending and geographical price differences are preliminary in nature 
because of data constraints. Nevertheless, the findings present some empirical 
evidence of inadequate provision and the need of larger financial commitment from 
higher-level administrations. The results also lead us to the issue of sub-provincial 
fiscal arrangement. They suggest that a reduction in the number of tiers of 
intergovernmental fiscal relationship may be a desirable reform option. More work in 
the future to improve the measurement of cost of provision is helpful to a 
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sophisticated assessment of the form and the size of intergovernmental fiscal 
assistance for compulsory education across the localities in China. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter Two reviews two types 
of literature. The first type is studies conducted by Chinese scholars and researchers. 
From them, we gain understanding of the issues concerning China's compulsory 
education. The second type is research carried out in the foreign countries. These 
studies introduce concepts and methods that are useful for analyzing education 
finance issues. We apply such ideas as educational price adjustment and standard 
expenditure to form the measure of degree of provision in our work. The methods of 
establishing these tools are explained in Chapter Three. Also, the chapter elaborates 
the models for regression analysis and the formula for education transfer estimation. 
Results on (1) degree of provision, (2) the impact of various factors on education 
expenditure, and (3) the amount of funding involved in the suggested transfer 





This chapter consists of five sections. The first section reviews the studies 
that discuss the state of compulsory education in China. They bring up issues such as 
insufficient resources and disparity in education expenditure. In the second section, 
we turn to some foreign research which highlights the desirability of adjusting for 
inter-area cost differences when comparing expenditure level between localities or 
estimating spending needs. The third section focuses on the literature about 
regression analyses of education expenditure. In the fourth section, we take a look at 
the school aid formulae that are adopted in the United States. Then, we review the 
studies on education transfers by Chinese researchers and suggest that the 
mechanism named foundation program in the U.S. be a potential education financing 
method in China. Closing remarks are made in the last section. 
2.1 Problems and issues 
A number of articles and studies point out the problems confronting the 
provision of compulsory education in China. Under the decentralized system, the 
ability to provide funding for education varies by localities. In some localities, 
funding for non-wage expenditure is scanty; in some of the others, the problem of 
dilapidated school buildings is serious (Wu and Gong 2003; Wong et al. 2003; Ma 
and Long 2000). Also, there have been reports of wage arrears. Such a problem has 
been aggravated by the central government raising the salaries and the policy of 
giving qualified community teachers the state teacher status which leads to increased 
expenditure responsibility on salaries (Chen 2003). Without adequate revenue, local 
governments fail to pay teachers on time. Some areas do not afford or are not willing 
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to arrange for the continually increasing salary budgets. They turn to employ 
substitute teachers who usually do not have accredited qualifications. This reduces 
the fiscal stress of local governments but very likely has negative impact on quality 
of education at the same time (Wong et al. 2003). 
Other problems occur in the pursuit of universal compulsory education. First, 
debts pile up in some localities as they work towards the targets of nine-year 
compulsory education plan. Since the plan is an important national policy and 
progress is monitored, officials out of career concerns try to fijlfill the mandate from 
above. Moreover, there exists competition between localities. In order to build 
additional schools, officials borrow from various sources even if it may be difficult 
to repay the debts in the future. For example, Yin (2003) finds that Wufeng County 
in Hubei has accumulated debts at township and village levels. These debts are 
primarily borrowings for the implementation of nine-year compulsory education and 
they have amounted to $19 million. Second, payment of fees for children's study 
puts higher pressure on the family budgets of the lower-income households. Given 
the high private cost of education, children from poor families are more vulnerable to 
withdrawal from school. Gansu once exempted minority students from tuition and 
miscellaneous fees, but weak fiscal condition did not allow the measure to continue 
(Wong et al. 2003) 
A recent challenge to rural compulsory education is the "tax-for-fee" reform. 
Jia and Zhao (2002) finds from their field study that shortfall in revenue occurs after 
the reform. In Qingyang County in Anhui, there is a shortfall of $5 million even 
though they have received a transfer of about $5.6 million from the provincial 
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government. Some towns and townships are still responsible for part of the subsidies 
paid to teachers but they cannot finance that expenditure through surcharges and self-
raised funds any more. Besides, grants from upper-tier governments for the repair of 
dilapidated buildings are given once only and the amount is small relative to actual 
needs. Su's (2002) case study of Heyang County in Shaanxi also exhibits the 
financial strain posed by the reform. The county encounters increased difficulty in 
paying salaries, servicing debts and reconstructing dilapidated school buildings. 
While most of the articles and studies provide descriptive analyses of the 
conditions of compulsory education in China, a few others conduct statistical 
analyses of the disparities and trends in education expenditure. In its paper, the task 
group of Shanghai zhili kaifa yanjiusuo ketizu (1996) divides the provinces into five 
regions according to the level of educational development. It compares the regional 
difference in education spending in 1994 with that in 1988 and shows that the 
difference widened. Wang, Du, and Liu (1998) also classify the provinces into 
regions for analysis. Based on an index of economic development, they divide the 
provinces into four regions. Using the maximum-to-minimum ratio, they find that 
disparity in per-capita education expenditure in 1994 was bigger than that in 1988. 
The paper also shows that extra-budgetary share of total education funding increased 
over the period. In particular, there was bigger increase in the share of tuition and 
miscellaneous fees. Concerning regional differences, greater reliance on extra-
budgetary funding is observed in the developed (except Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Shanghai) and intermediately developed regions. 
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With the availability of county-level data in recent years, Pan (2000) and 
Wang (2001) investigate sub-provincial disparity in per-pupil education expenditure. 
The latter has a wider scope as it considers the extra-budgetary expenditure as well. 
By means of the Generalized Entropy class of indices, Wang finds that the disparity 
is mainly caused by within-province inequality than between-province inequality, 
and greater disparity occurs in per-pupil extra-budgetary expenditure than the 
budgetary one. In addition, disparity in per-pupil budgetary expenditure has a larger 
influence on the disparity in per-pupil total expenditure for primary education, 
whereas both the per-pupil budgetary and extra-budgetary expenditure have 
determining effect on the disparity in per-pupil total expenditure for junior secondary 
education. 
2.2 Disparity in education provision 
Inter-area differences in education provision have been a topic of interest in 
the field of education finance. While it is common to look at the issue in terms of 
actual expenditure, the existence of differences in the cost of providing educational 
services among locations within a country implies that a preferable approach to 
comparison of education provision level is to take account of cost factor. It is 
especially relevant to large countries such as China which have considerable inter-
area differences. In the United States, scholars and researchers have embarked on 
developing educational cost indices to adjust for variations in the cost of education 
provision across states or school districts. Their work gives some insight into the 
rationale and techniques for making analysis beyond actual education expenditure. A 
cost index is useful for analysing disparities in real expenditure which reflects more 
accurately the differences in resources allocated to education. It would facilitate the 
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examination of how real spending connects with educational outcome such as student 
performance. Also, the incorporation of cost adjustment in school aid formula would 
enhance objectivity of grants distribution (Barro 1994). 
Researchers have explored different methods for compiling an educational 
cost index. Two of the methods have been continuously researched and refined. The 
first type generates a cost index from the estimation of an education cost function, 
and the second type constructs an index by utilizing input price indices. In the first 
method, a cost function for education is estimated directly or indirectly. The direct 
estimation involves educational outputs, input prices and characteristics of school 
districts as explanatory variables for education expenditure. Data on test scores and 
dropout rate are taken as indicators of outputs. However, such output measures are 
not necessarily available. The alternative is to estimate a reduced-form expenditure 
function (indirect estimation). In this estimation, variables that affect the demand for 
educational outputs are put in the equation. Hence, education expenditure per pupil is 
a function of income, property value, input prices and district characteristics 
(Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger 1995; Downes and Pogue 1994). 
Both the direct and indirect estimations have input prices and district 
characteristics as explanatory variables. Usually, average salaries of teachers and 
school staff are the variables for input prices. Variables for district characteristics 
include student backgrounds and size of enrolment. They are used to reflect the 
impact of student needs and scale on cost of provision. Duncombe, Ruggiero, and 
Yinger take a step further by adding an efficiency variable which controls the 
situation that "a district is spending more than necessary to obtain its output level". 
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With the coefficient estimates, the cost index is established as follows: 
Estimated per-pupil expenditure for individual district is obtained by holding 
educational outputs* and efficiency variable at mean values but letting other variables 
vary by districts. Then, a ratio of estimated per-pupil expenditure for individual 
district to average per-pupil expenditure is calculated as the cost index. It depicts the 
geographical differences in costs required to attain certain quality of education 
In the second method of constructing the educational cost index, researchers 
focus on the differences in input prices across localities. Geographical price indices 
for respective inputs are weighted by the nationwide share of these inputs in 
education expenditure. They are then added together to form a composite price index. 
In general, inputs are divided into personnel and non-personnel components. 
Personnel components refer to remuneration to teachers and school staff. Non-
personnel components involve spending on books, supplies, energy, equipment, 
facilities and other non-instructional services. Among these items, salary payments 
take up the largest proportion (Barro 1994; Chambers 1998). 
To derive the price ratios for personnel components, regression analysis is 
applied to control for the influence of staff characteristics and work conditions on 
salary. In earlier effort by Barro to obtain a price index of teachers for the whole 
country, only teachers' qualifications and experience are included as explanatory 
variables because of data limitation. Later in Chambers' study, a wider range of 
variables is available to estimate a hedonic wage model. Differences in the salaries of 
4 In the case of indirect estimation, income and property value are set to their mean values 
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school staff across localities are explained by variations in personal characteristics, 
work conditions, student characteristics, living environment, job market competition, 
and cost of living. Given the regression equation, Chambers predicts the salaries that 
each district needs to pay in order to employ staff with average characteristics under 
average work conditions. These are estimated by holding personal characteristics and 
work conditions at mean values while allowing student characteristics, living 
environment, job market competition and cost of living to vary by localities. A ratio 
of predicted salaries to the average represents the price ratio for personnel 
components. It reflects only the salary differentials that are beyond the control' by 
local officials. 
In comparison with the method just described, the first method (estimation of 
cost function) has more comprehensive coverage of cost impact. Also, it considers 
the connection between educational costs and outcomes. However, application of this 
method is challenged by a number of issues such as data availability, theoretical 
justification and model specification. As pointed out by researchers, it is difficult to 
understand and interpret the process through which educational outcomes are 
generated (Fowler and Monk 2001; Chambers 1998). 
The concept of inter-area cost adjustment is applied in the fiscal transfer 
system in Australia as well. The country has a sophisticated transfer system that 
takes into account the gap between fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. In the 
assessment of expenditure needs, "standardized expenditures" (SDE) are estimated to 
reflect the per-capita spending required for the provision of average services with 
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inter-state cost differences adjusted. It is calculated as the product of "standard 
expenditure" (SE) and "combined disability factor" (d), i.e., 
SDEi = SEi X di 
where SEi is the national average per-capita expenditure on ith category, and di is a 
combined measure of factors that cannot be controlled by the state government but 
affect service demand and cost of provision. 
The specific disability factors employed to estimate the standardized 
expenditures differ between expenditure categories. For the primary and secondary 
education categories, an array of disability factors are included to capture cost 
variations stemming from differences in input costs, administrative and service 
delivery scale, students' background, and accessibility to major supply channels. 
Besides, they take account of differences in the need for telecommunication, travel, 
freight, and allowance payment. The higher costs required in senior secondary 
education and the extra costs facing schools in the capital due to net inflow of 
students are also reflected in the disability factors. A combination of these factors 
indicates whether a state needs to spend above or below average to reach average 
level of education provision (Commonwealth Grants Commission 2001). 
Research and practice in the United States and Australia offer insight into the 
use of inter-area cost adjustment. In our research, we follow the method of 
developing an educational price index as a weighted aggregate of input price ratios. 
Theoretically, the wage and price ratios should be adjusted for differences in input 
quality and other controllable factors, however, data limitation makes regression 
estimation unfeasible. For the moment, we could only draw on actual wage and 
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expenditure data to construct the composite price index. The educational price index 
is then used to derive price-adjusted standard total expenditures, a measure similar to 
but not as comprehensive as the "standardized expenditures" mentioned above. 
Price-adjusted standard total expenditures are established to serve two purposes. First, 
a ratio of actual total expenditures to price-adjusted standard total expenditures is an 
estimated indicator of the degree of education provision. Second, the price-adjusted 
standard total expenditures are the spending levels that the proposed education 
transfer mechanism aims to guarantee. 
2.3 Factors explaining variations in education expenditure: regression analysis 
Apart from the issue of disparities in education provision, a question of 
interest is what factors are associated with variations in per-pupil spending across 
localities. Here, we briefly review the studies on regression of education expenditure 
that have been conducted by foreign and Chinese researchers. 
Estimations carried out by foreign researchers often incorporate the median 
voter hypothesis, which assumes that the chosen level of public expenditure 
optimizes the utility of median voter whose vote is decisive in the election of local 
officials. The explanatory variables for education expenditure therefore include 
median household income, tax price，，fiscal resources of the locality, input prices, 
and other locality characteristics. In fact, this is equivalent to the reduced-form 
expenditure function mentioned earlier. 
5 tax price refers to tax implications for voters per unit increase of educational services. 
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The focus of estimation varies by research. For example, Ladd (1975) gives 
special attention to the tax price factor. She explores the differences in tax price 
effect exerted by the commercial and industrial components of property tax base. Her 
empirical results show that commercial property affects voter's anticipation of tax 
burden to a larger extent than industrial property. In other studies, such' as 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Baum (1986), greater focus is put on the income 
and price elasticities of demand for education. The signs of elasticities are consistent 
across studies with positive sign on income elasticity and negative sign on price 
elasticity. At the same time, the absolute values of elasticities are diverse as 
researchers use different dataset and different specifications of model. 
Because of differences in political regime, western approach to model 
education demand is not applicable to China. It is likely that the choice of education 
provision in China maximizes the objective function of government officials rather 
than that of local residents. Education spending would be influenced by the amount 
of financial resources available which are in turn affected by the level of economic 
development of the localities. Other potential factors include demographic 
characteristics, geographical characteristics and government policies. 
Wang (2001) conducts regression analyses of per-pupil education expenditure 
in China. For each of the schooling levels (primary and junior secondary), three 
separate equations are estimated. The dependent variables are per-pupil total 
expenditure, per-pupil budgetary expenditure, and per-pupil extra-budgetary 
expenditure respectively, while the explanatory variables are the same for all the. 
three equations. The estimation results show that per-pupil education expenditure is 
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positively related to per-capita fiscal revenue, and negatively related to student size 
as a share of total population. It is found that extra-budgetary expenditure in rural 
counties is significantly lower as compared to urban districts and counties in the 
metropolises. Besides, provincial effects are significant. Wang highlights from the 
results that, with respect to primary education, many central provinces have lower 
per-pupil budgetary expenditure and greater reliance on extra-budgetary funds than 
the western counterparts holding other factors constant. 
The regression analysis in this research differs from Wang's estimation in the 
following aspects. First, urban districts in all provinces and counties in metropolises 
are not included in our regression. Second, dummy variables for a number of county 
features (mountainous counties, minority counties and poor counties) are used so that 
the effects of these characteristics on education expenditure can be observed. 
2.4 Financing arrangement 
Another aspect of this research is to suggest an education transfer 
arrangement that is of potential use in China. Scholars and researchers have stressed 
the need of greater financial support from upper-tier governments to improve the 
provision of education in rural China (West 1997; Su 2002; Wu and Gong 2003; 
Wong et al. 2003). Nonetheless, there are only a few quantitative studies on 
alternative ways to finance compulsory education in China. The following are four 
major mechanisms that are adopted by the state governments in the United States for 
allocating school aid to local school districts. These models provide useful 
information for discussion of possible school finance system in China. 
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The first type is a flat grant system. It distributes equal per-pupil grants to 
local school districts. Spending above the grants is financed by local revenue. 
The second type is called foundation program. Under this system, the state 
government chooses the foundation level of spending and required property tax rate^. 
If the potential fiscal revenue collected at the required tax rate cannot fund the 
foundation amount fully, the state will provide for the shortfall. In formula, 
A = n.f-r*.V 
where A = state aid to local school district, n = number of students, f = foundation 
guarantee per pupil, r* = required property tax rate, V = assessed value of local 
properties. 
The third type is known as power-equalizing plan. Instead of determining a 
foundation expenditure level and a required tax rate, the state government sets a 
guaranteed property tax base. Multiplying the guaranteed tax base to local tax rate 
gives the guaranteed revenue yield for each local school district. If the guaranteed 
revenue yield exceeds the revenue that can be obtained from local tax base, local 
district receive the difference in revenue from the state government. In formula, 
A = r-n.Vg - r. V 
where A = state aid to local school district, r = local property tax rate, n = number of 
students, Vg = guaranteed property tax base per pupil, V = assessed value of local 
properties. 
6 In the U.S.，revenue for education comes mainly from property tax. 
22 
The fourth type is full state funding. Under this system, local school districts 
are not involved in school finance. The state government decides on the education 
expenditure to be spent and allocates equal funding per pupil. 
The advantages and disadvantages of these mechanisms are discussed in 
articles and books on school funding, e.g., Verstegen (2002), Swanson and King 
(1997). Here, we summarize the key issues pinpointed by these studies. The flat 
grant system possesses no equalizing feature as it does not consider differences in 
economic conditions and tax rate across localities. In contrast, other three 
mechanisms demonstrate some forms of equalization. Under the full state funding 
system, localities have equal per-pupil education expenditure if they are not allowed 
to invest extra with their own revenue. Foundation program equalizes the effort 
needed to attain the foundation level of spending. As long as localities impose the 
required tax rate, they would have sufficient financial resources for the foundation 
expenditure. As for power-equalizing plan, it aims to allow localities exerting the 
same effort to reach the same education spending level irrespective of their tax base. 
Both the foundation program and power-equalizing plan distribute larger transfers to 
localities with smaller tax base. The difference between the two is that the former 
offers equalization up to the foundation expenditure level, whereas the latter extends 
equalization to other spending level. 
In practice, power-equalizing plan does not achieve its intended equalization 
to the full extent. As localities can determine their tax rate, state governments do not 
have absolute control over the size of transfers. In view of this, state governments set 
ceilings on the amount of per-pupil spending to be funded. Besides, according to the 
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principle of power-equalizing plan, localities with tax base above the guaranteed 
level should remit the excess revenue. However, political force restrains this from 
happening. As a result, these wealthy localities enjoy larger revenue than it would be 
implied by their tax rate. In other words, localities do not necessarily get equal 
financial resources even if they impose the same tax rate. The ones with tax base 
above the guaranteed level are at an advantage. 
To our knowledge, Du and Wang (2000), and Shanghai zhili kaifa yanjiusuo 
ketizu (1998) are the only studies that carried out quantitative analyses of possible 
education transfer arrangement in China. The work by Shanghai zhili kaifa yanjiusuo 
ketizu is quoted in Du and Wang's study. Its estimation of education transfers to poor 
counties is based on a range of variables related to wages and benefits to teachers, 
financial aid to students, and expenditure on school operation, small equipment, 
maintenance, and social security. The values of these variables at the 20也,50也，and 
80出 percentile are used to formulate a minimum standard for per-pupil expenditure. 
Du and Wang (2000) propose another way to establish standard per-pupil 
expenditure so that less complicated computation is demanded as compared to 
Shanghai zhili kaifa yanjiusuo ketizu's method. They suggest two per-pupil 
standards, with one equal to the 70 percent of national average per-pupil expenditure 
and the other equal to the 80 percent of national average. Then, the standard per-
pupil expenditure is multiplied by an adjustment coefficient which is a proxy for 
provincial effort in financing education. At the same time, actual per-pupil 
expenditure is divided by a wage index. The amount of per-pupil transfers to each 
province is the difference between effort-adjusted standard per-pupil expenditure and 
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cost-adjusted actual per-pupil expenditure. It appears that the transfers suggested by 
Du and Wang are estimated in real term but they should be in nominal term. In fact, 
it would be more appropriate to use the wage index for adjusting the standard 
expenditure rather than deflating the actual expenditure. 
To consider an alternative education transfer mechanism that may be feasible 
in China, we look at the applicability of the U.S. school aid formulae to China's 
circumstances. Du and Wang also comment on this subject. We agree with them that 
flat grant and full state funding are least suitable for use as education transfer 
systems in China. Given the large inter-area disparity in economic development in 
the country, poorer localities require greater financial assistance but flat grant does 
not attend to these needs. Although full state funding can exclude the influence of 
fiscal capacity on education provision, it demands huge financial commitment from 
upper-tier governments because localities do not contribute to the financing of 
expenditure. Foundation program and power-equalizing plan, on the other hand, are 
better options. They address the equalization issue and involve local effort at the 
same time. And we think that foundation program would be a more realistic ‘ 
approach at present because the extent of equalization covered by power-equalization 
plan is less likely to be achieved. 
Therefore, we estimate the size of funding that will be involved if a transfer 
mechanism based on the foundation program is implemented in China. Unlike Du 
and Wang's estimation which calculates the transfers as the gap between standard 
and actual expenditure, our estimation focuses on the gap between standard 
expenditure and fiscal capacity considering fiscal capacity as a more desirable 
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measure of the ability of localities to finance education. Also, the scope of our 
analysis extends to county level so that differences between areas within the same 
province would be taken care of. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have looked at various studies undertaken in China and 
foreign countries on issues related to education finance. From the studies conducted 
by foreign researchers, it can be seen that significant effort has been made to develop 
comprehensive indices of geographical differences in cost of education provision. In 
Australia, the grants committee uses "disability factors" to adjust for inter-state cost 
variations so as to derive standardized expenditures, an important part of the 
calculation of transfers from federal government. In the United States, researchers 
have worked on the construction of educational cost indices. Methods include 
regression estimation of cost function and weighted aggregation of input price 
indices. Similar to other empirical studies, further improvement on data availability, 
theory and model specifications are crucial to the refinement of cost indices. 
Concerning financial assistance to schools from upper tiers of government, the state 
governments in the United States have made use of school aid formulae for a long 
time. The various types of funding mechanism differ from each other in terms of 
degree of equalization and requirement on local contribution. 
The review of the literature on China suggests that not many empirical 
analyses have been carried out on the topic of education finance yet. Some studies 
investigate the disparities in education expenditures across provinces or counties, and 
few attempts on estimation of education transfers are found. The majority of studies 
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are descriptive in nature. Observations from field trips show that inadequate funding 
and the "tax-for-fee" reform pose difficulties for localities to finance education. In 
light of existing research, we would further the empirical analysis of education 
provision in rural China. By comparing the actual expenditures with estimated 
benchmark level, we examine the variations in degree of provision across the nation 
and identify the localities that are likely to lack educational resources. By means of a 
mechanism modeled on the foundation program in the United States, we estimate the 
size of education transfers needed to assist localities whose economic conditions do 




This chapter sets out the methods adopted in this research. After an 
introduction to the scope of estimation and sources of data, the process of 
constructing the indicator "degree of provision" is described. Then, we discuss the 
variables involved in the regression analysis of education expenditure. Finally, we 
explain how the school aid formula originated in the United States can be adapted for 
use in China. 
County-level data in the year 2000 are employed to study the education 
finance issues. As the focus is on the rural part of China, county-level urban districts 
{qu) are not in our scope of investigation. Data on education expenditure is obtained 
from Zhongguo jiaoyu jingfei tongji nianjian {China Educational Finance Statistical 
Yearbook). Statistics on basic conditions of counties can be found in Zhongguo 
xianshi shehui jingji tongji nianjian {China County Statistical Yearbook). GDP and 
fiscal data are available from Quanguo dishixian caizheng tongji ziliao {China Sub-
provincial Finance Statistics), and population data is provided in 2000 Population 
Census. 
3.1 Estimation of degree of provision 
The first focus of this research is on the disparities in education provision. As 
summarized in the previous chapter, overseas research has highlighted that to obtain 
a better comparison of educational resources among localities, one should consider 
the issue of geographical variations in cost of provision. Such an issue is also 
relevant in the case of China given the regional differences in development and 
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geographical characteristics. Besides, although accounts of underprovided education 
in China are not unfamiliar, they cover only part of the country. An attempt of this 
research is to present an overall picture of deviations of compulsory education 
spending from estimated benchmark level. The benchmark level takes into account 
the national salary standard for teachers, the national average share of education 
expenditure spent on wage and non-wage components, and inter-area price 
differences. It is intended to reflect the amount of spending required to provide 
education of average condition with the adjustment of geographical input cost 
differences. A measure of degree of provision {DP) is calculated as the ratio of actual 
total expenditure (ACTE) ^to price-adjusted standard total expenditure (STE), i.e., 
ACTF 
DPi= ' , i = rth county (1) 
STEi 
When DP is greater than one, it indicates investment of educational resources is 
above the benchmark. On the other hand, when DP is smaller than one, it indicates 
that resources fall short of the benchmark. 
The estimation of STE involves recurrent expenditure and infrastructure 
expenditure, which are the two streams of expenditure in overall education spending^. 
Ideally, 
xSPRE, xC^) + IENJ, (2a) 
k 
where 
i = rth county 
A： = 1 if primary education; 2 if junior secondary education 
7 The county-level education expenditure obtained from dataset includes spending on high schools.' 
The portion of spending on high schools is subtracted from the total education expenditure by using 
the provincial information on the share of secondary school students in high schools and the average 
per-pupil high school expenditure. 
Box 1 in the Appendix lists the components of education expenditure in China. 
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STEi = price-adjusted standard total expenditure 
riki = size of population aged 7-12 for primary education and that aged 13-15 for 
junior secondary education^ 
SPREk = standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure 
Cki = educational price index 
lENki = infrastructure expenditure needs 
However, since it is not feasible to estimate the infrastructure expenditure needs (JEN) 
under present information, provincial average per-pupil infrastructure expenditure is 
used so that the infrastructure component in standard total expenditure is not missed 
out. Also, the educational price index (C) can only be established at the provincial 
instead of county level. Hence, the equation for STE becomes 
xC^. (2b) 
k 
where j = yth province and PIE]^ = average per-pupil expenditure on infrastructure. 
The definitions of other items follow those in Equation (2a). 
What then remains to be tackled is the estimation of standard per-pupil 
recurrent expenditure and the composite educational price index. The derivation of 
these variables is detailed in the following subsections. 
9 The 2000 Population Census provides county-level data on population size by age group. Each age 
group is an aggregate of five years of age. The size of school-age population is estimated by dividing 
each relevant age group (aged 5-9，10-14 and 15-19) equally and extracting the sum for our school-
age group. Although the age for enrolment is six years old, most of the students that were in primary 
and junior secondary schools during the year 2000 aged 7-15 by the time when Census was conducted 
(November). 
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3.1.1 Estimation of the standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure (SPRE) 
Standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure is an estimate of the spending 
needed to provide education of certain quality level at average cost. In the United 
States, researchers choose from a number of criteria such as test scores, graduation 
rate and diploma passing rate and then estimate the amount of investment required if 
selected performance goals have to be fulfilled. For our case, it is difficult to build a 
link between standard expenditure and targeted student performance. Instead, 
standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure is estimated by utilizing national salary 
standard and nationwide share of education expenditure allocated to respective 
components. Specifically, 
S P R E k = ^ ^ , (3) 
PCTB, 
where 
k=\ if primary education; 2 if junior secondary education 
SPREk = standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure 
Bk = standard per-pupil expenditure on basic wage 
PCTBk = nationwide share of recurrent expenditure spent on basic wage 
The estimation is done in this way because there have been reports of 
localities having few resources for non-wage items such as expenditure on equipment 
and maintenance. Therefore, our estimation allocates standard percentages, i.e., 
national average shares to components of education expenditure. Standard per-pupil 
expenditure on basic wage (Bk) is derived from the national standard for teachers' 
basic salaries. Basic wage comprises two parts: fixed salary and allowance. 
According to the wage structure reform in 1993，fixed salary makes up 70 percent 
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whereas allowance can be up to 30% of total basic wage. State Council's document 
(2000) lists the fixed salaries (FS) for teachers of various ranks (59 ranks for primary 
school teachers and 60 for secondary school teachers). The maximum amount of 
FS 
allowance for each rank can be obtained by ——xO.3. Since allowance need not be 
0.7 
paid in full, we include half the maximum amount of allowance in the calculation of 
average basic wage for teachers. The resulted average basic wage for primary school 
and secondary school teachers are $5770.78and $6805.83 per annum respectively 
Using the school staff-student ratio suggested by central government (1:23 for rural 
primary and 1:18 for rural junior secondary), standard per-pupil expenditure on basic 
wage {Bk) is equal to $251 (=$5770.78/23) for primary education and $378 
(=$6805.83/18) for junior secondary education. 
The nationwide share of recurrent expenditure spent on basic wage (PCTB]^ 
is 39% for both rural primary and junior secondary education. Dividing standard per-
pupil expenditure on basic wage (Bk) by this percentage gives standard per-pupil 
recurrent expenditure (SPREk). SPREk is estimated to be $643 (=$251/0.39) for 
primary education and $970 (=$378/0.39) for junior secondary education. 
i. 1.2 Construction of an educational price index (C) 
As discussed in the chapter of literature review, a comprehensive cost-of-
education index embraces a range of cost-affecting factors, e.g., input prices, student 
needs, scale of economies and geographical characteristics. In this research, we only 
take into account the inter-provincial differences in input prices due to limited 
information. Based on the concept employed in some of the foreign studies, e.g., 
10 Monetary terms are expressed in Yuan. 
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Barro (1994) and Chambers (1998), an educational price index is constructed as a 
weighted sum of input price ratios. Algebraically, 
where 
A： = 1 if primary education; 2 if junior secondary education 
j province 
Vk = nationwide share of recurrent expenditure on personnel component 
fV. 
^ = wage ratio 
W 
fhk= nationwide share of recurrent expenditure on /rth expenditure 
category 
P, 
= = i n p u t price ratio for Mh expenditure category 
Ph 
(1 — Vk - ^ f j ^ ) = remaining components of recurrent expenditure 
h 
P' 
assigned unity price ratio, i.e., = = 1 
The wage ratio, Wj/W, is a ratio of wage for teachers and staff in 7th 
province to the national average. 
Each of the other input price ratios is a 
ratio of unit price for Mh expenditure category inyth province to the national average. 
The expenditure categories include repair and maintenance (h=l), desks and chairs 
(/z=2), and books (h=3). Unit prices (f%) are obtained from dividing spending by 
quantity (Table 2). Price and wage ratios can be derived for primary education and 
junior secondary education individually, but the average is taken as the smoothed 
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ratios. This gives the set of price and wage ratios for compiling the composite index 
(Table 3). The weights for the wage and price ratios are the nationwide share of 
recurrent expenditure on respective category. 
When forming the educational price index, several limitations should be 
noted. First, wages and unit prices are influenced by factors apart from involuntary 
cost variations. Since the price and wage ratios used to develop the index are derived 
from actual spending and wage data, factors such as qualifications of teachers, 
quality of other inputs, and governments' policy also affect the estimates. 
Considering that the higher-than-unity composite price index facing the coastal 
provinces can be partly attributed to the hiring of teachers with better qualifications, 
the purchase of resources of better quality and the offer of larger subsidies and 
benefits payment to teachers, an adjustment is made to the index. The extent by 
which the price index is higher than unity is discounted by half in these provinces 
The entire set of price index is then rescaled so that the weighted mean is equal to 
unityi2 (Table 4). In Chambers' study, which compiles a cost-of-education index for 
school districts in the United States, regression model is applied to estimate the wage 
ratio which reflects the cost needed to recruit school staff of comparable 
qualifications. It is a way to improve the education price index for China if data on 
teachers' characteristics and work conditions are available. Second, we can only 
estimate the price index at the provincial level but not the county level. This prevents 
us from capturing a more detailed picture about the variation in degree of provision. 
11 These provinces are Beijing, Tianjing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. It does 
not include Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong and Hainan as they have a price index lower than or around 
unity. The adjustment made to the index follows the idea of applying discounting in the calculation of 
input cost factor for the states in Australia by the Commonwealth Grants Commission (2001). They 
employ discounting to "allow for possible policy differences, data deficiencies and differences in the 
labour market segmentation between the private and public sectors". 
12 The weight is the school-age population. 
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Third, some factors that may affect the cost of education provision have not been 
taken into account. As suggested by Chambers, factors such as climatic conditions, 
energy cost, special needs of certain groups of students, and school operation scale 
are potential causes of differences in cost of provision. These limitations aside, the 
educational price index is the best we can come up with as a proxy for whether a 
locality faces higher or lower cost than the average. 
After estimating the standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure and the 
educational price index, we arrive at the price-adjusted standard per-pupil recurrent 
expenditure (Table 5). The measure of degree of provision (DP) is then obtained 
through Equation (1) and (2b). 
3.2 Regression analysis 
Besides the estimation of an index that tries to illustrate the degree of 
education provision across localities, regression analysis is undertaken to look at the 
effect of various factors on investment in education. In western countries, the 
analysis of education expenditure is often framed in terms of production of 
educational outputs and demand of pivotal voter for educational services. In the case 
of China, a more plausible view is that the supply of educational services is 
determined by the government officials. Spending on education is administratively 
determined. The central government sets the policies on education and the local 
bureaucrats are responsible for the implementation. How much is invested depends 
on the resources at the disposal of local governments, the cost of provision and the 
behaviour of government such as officials' preference for spending on education. 
Factors including economic development, structure of economy, demographic 
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characteristics, geographical characteristic and policy factor are considered relevant 
forces for the differences in education investment among localities. The specific 
explanatory variables put in our regression equations for per-pupil spending are 
explained below. 
GDP per capita {income) is an indicator of economic development, which 
constrains the capacity of both budgetary and extra-budgetary revenue for education. 
Moreover, a higher income is likely to reflect an increasing willingness to invest in 
education and the demand for higher quality of education in wealthier areas. While 
the variable contains the effects of various components, each has a positive 
relationship with per-pupil education expenditure. The coefficient of income is 
expected to be positive. 
The share of GDP from the primary sector (agric) represents the economic 
structure of the locality. When there is a larger percentage of GDP originating from 
agricultural activities, the base for fiscal revenue from various sources including 
value-added tax, business tax and enterprise income tax is smaller. Other things 
being equal, agric is perceived to have a negative impact on per-pupil expenditure. 
The share of population in school age (sckage) is used to test whether higher 
school-age population share poses a constraint to education provision. A significant 
and negative coefficient will be observed if higher share of population in school age 
leads to reduced resources for each student. 
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School-age population density (pupden) is added to the equation to take into 
account the effect of economies of scale. In localities with higher density, there is 
potential cost saving from higher student-teacher ratio and sharing of resources 
among larger number of students. The variable is expected to exhibit negative 
coefficient. 
A set of dummy variables is employed to look at the variations in per-pupil 
spending that are connected with county types, which include mountainous counties, 
minority counties and poor counties. Zhongguo xianshi shehui jingji tongji nianjian 
{China County Statistical Yearbook) provides the list of counties classified into the 
above groups. Geographical and policy effects are to be reflected by these dummy 
variables. The mountainous counties are usually less accessible. Therefore, it is 
likely that these localities spend more to accommodate geographical constraint, e.g., 
providing boarding facilities. The minority counties are given greater fiscal support 
from the central government. Earmarked grants are set aside for developing 
education in minority areas. Also, the transitional equalizing transfer arrangement 
allocates additional transfers to minority regions. As for the poor counties, they are 
designated localities that receive assistance from the national poverty alleviation plan. 
With regard to the education aspect, project aid has been provided to facilitate the 
implementation of compulsory education in poor areas. Since localities may belong 
to one or more of the above county types, they are categorized into eight different 
groups: solely mountainous counties {mtonly), solely minority counties {minonly), 
solely poor counties (portly) ^ ,^ poor and minority counties (pmin), poor and 
mountainous counties (pmt), minority and mountainous counties (minmt), poor and 
13 The term "solely" means that the counties belong to one locality type but not the other two. For • ‘ 
example, solely mountainous counties are those that are mountainous but not poor nor minority. 
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minority and mountainous counties (pminmt), and ordinary counties. Ordinary 
counties are the control group. The inclusion of these dummy variables allows 
comparison among counties with different combinations of characteristics. Ceteris 
paribus, the dummies are expected to have positive coefficients. 
As there is no definite functional form for the estimation, the following 
specifications are estimated. In the first model, the continuous explanatory variables 
are in linear and squared terms. The second model transforms the continuous 
explanatory variables to natural logarithmic form "^^ . The equations are estimated via 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
First specification: 
ln(ppexp) = 00+ ai income + aisqincome + as agric + 04 sqagric + as schage + 
Oe sqschage +017 pupden + ag sqpupden + 019 mtonly + otio minonly + 
CLuponly + aiTpmin + a^pmt + an minmt + di^pminmt + Z cnJDk + 8 
(5) 
Second specification: 
\n(ppexp) = Po+ Pi\n(income) + f>2^n(agnc) + P3^n{schage) + f,4\n(pupden) + 
^smtonly + ^eminonly + 如ponly + ^^min + ^9pmt + ^lominmt + 
^npminmt (6) 
where 
ppexp = per-pupil expenditure on compulsory education 
14 Studies quoted in the chapter of literature review carry out regressions through the following 
specifications: (1) double-logarithmic, (2) estimation with dependent variable in natural logarithmic 
form and explanatory variables in natural logarithmic or linear form. 
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income = GDP per capita (in thousand Yuan) 
sqincome = squared term of income 
agric = share of GDP from the primary sector (%) 
sqagric = squared term of agric 
schage = school-age population as a share of total population (%) 
sqschage = squared term of schage 
pupden = school-age population density 
sqpupden = squared term of pupden 
mtonly = 1 if the county is solely a mountainous county; 0 otherwise 
minoly = 1 if the county is solely a minority county; 0 otherwise 
ponly = 1 if the county is solely a poor county; 0 otherwise 
pmin = 1 if the county is a poor and minority county; 0 otherwise 
pmt = 1 if the county is a poor and mountainous county; 0 otherwise 
minmt = 1 if the county is a minority and mountainous county; 0 otherwise 
pminmt = 1 if the county is a poor, minority and mountainous county; 0 otherwise 
Dk = provincial dummy of the Ath province 
8 = error term 
3.3 Education transfer mechanism 
With an interest in the policy option for education financing in China, this 
research devotes part of the discussion to the possible financing method that will 
enable sharing of responsibility on a continuous basis. Drawing on the school aid 
formula named foundation program in the United States, we estimate the amount of 
transfers that would be required if the formula is implemented in China. This funding 
mechanism has the advantage of helping localities attain a level of education 
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investment deemed necessary. It considers inter-area disparities in tax capacity so 
that poorer localities are provided with greater financial support. The equation for 
this school aid formula is: 
A=n-f-/'V (7) 
where A = state aid to local school district, n = number of students, f = guaranteed 
spending per pupil, r = required property tax rate, V = assessed value of local 
properties. 
To make this formula applicable to the situation in China, different variables 
are used. Local school districts in the United States depend on the property tax to 
finance education, therefore, local property value represents the tax base for 
education investment. As for China, revenue for education is not tied to a particular 
tax. It is the overall fiscal condition that affects the resources for education. The best 
choice of variable for substituting the assessed value of local properties (V) would be 
the aggregate fiscal capacity which is a product of tax base and effective tax rate. 
And the best substitute for the required property tax rate (r*) would be a required 
share of fiscal capacity to be spent on education. However, an exact estimation of the 
fiscal capacity for each locality is difficult as it demands enormous amount of 
information which is not available. In our case, GDP is taken as a proxy for fiscal 
capacity given that economic condition and fiscal revenue are closely related. 
Regarding the variable it is also referred to as "required local effort". In 
the United States, r* is the required property tax rate. The original design of this 
school aid formula sets / to be the tax rate that the wealthiest district needs to apply 
in order to finance the foundation level of spending, but in reality the value of r* is at 
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the discretion of the state government. In our estimation, GDP is used to represent 
the fiscal capacity of localities in China. Hence, the required effort level in our 
formula is a required share of GDP to be invested in education. We set it as the 
national average share of GDP spent on compulsory education, implying that each 
county is asked to exert an effort level comparable to the average effort observed in 
the country. 
Another variable that we have to define in our equation is per-pupil 
guaranteed spending (/). In the U.S., it is usually perceived as the minimum 
education resources that should be invested. Similar to the required local effort ( / ) , 
the level of guaranteed spending is a policy choice of the grant-giving governments. 
In our simulation, per-pupil guaranteed spending is the estimated standard recurrent 
expenditure with the adjustment of geographical price differences. We make use of 
the standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure (SPRE) and the educational price index 
(C) developed in section 3.2 to form the guaranteed level. Infrastructure expenditure 
is not included. On the one hand, it is not possible to estimate a standard for 
infrastructure spending yet. On the other hand, expenditure on infrastructure is 
project-based which can be ftinded by separate earmarked grants. The education 
transfer system estimated in this research aims at financing the recurrent expenditure. 




i = rth county 
A: = 1 for primary education and 2 for junior secondary education 
J =力h province 
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A, = education transfers to counties 
nik= the size of school-age population 
SPREic = standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure 
Cfg- = educational price index 
r* = national average share of GDP spent on compulsory education^^ 
r, = GDP 
By means of this mechanism, a county will receive school aid if the resources 
obtained at required effort level are not enough for attaining the price-adjusted 
standard recurrent expenditure. If the resources obtained at required effort level are 
larger than the price-adjusted standard recurrent expenditure, no transfers will be 
allocated to the county. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has described the steps involved in establishing a measure of 
degree of provision which is a ratio of actual total expenditure to price-adjusted 
standard total expenditure. It has also explained the variables that are used in the 
regression analysis. While income and the dummy variables on county characteristics 
are expected to have positive relationship with per-pupil education expenditure, 
agricultural share of GDP and school-age population density are expected to exert 
negative impact. The effect of school-age population share is to be determined 
empirically. Regarding the proposed mechanism for education transfers, changes of 
variables are made in order to fit the formula to China's situation. 
15 It is a weighted average across the counties with the size of GDP as the weight. 
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Chapter Four 
Results and Discussion 
In this chapter, we present the results on the measure of degree of provision 
first. Then, the relationship between per-pupil expenditure and a number of economic, 
demographic, geographical, and policy variables are examined. Afterwards, the 
results on the simulation of an education transfer mechanism are reported and 
discussed. 
4.1 Degree of provision 
The estimated degree of provision offers indication of disparities in education 
provision across the country (Table 6). As expected, degree of provision is higher in 
the eastern region on average. But at the same time, there exist marked differences in 
the provision of education within the region. While some counties are able to spend 
well above, e.g., more than three times the benchmark expenditure, some spend 
considerably below the benchmark. Similar phenomenon is found in the central and 
western regions. To illustrate the variations in degree of provision statistically, 
Coefficient of Variation (CV), which is obtained from dividing the standard 
deviation by the mean, is used. The larger the CV, the greater is the variation. It is 
interesting to note that variation is largest in the western region (0.46) followed by 
the eastern region (0.45) and central region (0.33). Concerning the intra-provincial 
variations, they are highest in Gansu, Jiangsu, Xinjiang, Xizang and Shandong. At 
the other end, lowest variations are observed in Guangxi, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Hunan 
and Hainani6. The large variation observed in the western region is a reflection of 
16 Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai are excluded as they have small number of counties. 
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considerable differences in economic conditions, geographical conditions and upper-
tier governments' fiscal assistance among localities in the region. 
Table 7 further lists the number and percentage of counties in each province 
that have a degree of provision smaller than one. It also shows the distribution of 
counties according to the quintile groups of degree of provision. In a number of 
provinces, more than 50 percent of their counties have expenditure falling short of 
the benchmark level. Five of these provinces are in the western region. They are 
Guizhou, Xizang, Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai. Another four are eastern and central 
provinces including Hainan, Jiangxi, Henan and Hubei. In the majority of the 
remaining provinces, 30 to 50 percent of their counties spend below the benchmark 
level. The results suggest that the problem of inadequate provision is likely not 
confined to several provinces or a particular region. As indicated by the regional 
figures, 55 percent of the counties in the western region have a degree of provision 
less than one. The figures are 52 percent for the central region and 35 percent for the 
eastern region. 
In several eastern provinces including Jiangsu, Shandong and Guangdong, 
some percentage of counties do not reach the standard expenditure level although 
these provinces are generally perceived to be more developed. It reflects the 
imbalance of economic progress among localities within these provinces. In 
Guangdong, rapid development concentrates on the Pearl River Delta area (southern 
part of Guangdong). Other parts of Guangdong, especially the northern part, lag 
behind. Similarly, localities in southern Jiangsu enjoy higher economic success than 
the northern counterparts. As for Shandong, economic development of the eastern 
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part outperforms that of the western part. In both Jiangsu and Shandong, it is 
indicated that while a portion of counties has shortfall in educational resources, 
another portion has a significantly higher degree of provision (more than 35 percent 
of counties are in the highest quintile). It appears that better redistribution of 
resources to the less advantaged localities should be developed. 
A striking contrast is exhibited by Zhejiang, another coastal province in the 
east. They not only have few counties facing shortfall, but also attain comparatively 
high degree of provision (over half of the counties are in the top quintile). It is likely 
that these outcomes are facilitated by Zhejiang's different intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangement. The province aims to foster county-level economic development. 
Under their system, the provincial government directly manages the county-level 
governments {sheng guan xian). The usual fiscal relationship between the prefectural 
and county-level governments in other provinces does not exist in Zhejiang. 
Government officials in Zhejiang comment that such an arrangement allows counties 
to retain more fiscal revenue because they do not need to share revenue with the 
prefectural governments. Besides, the provincial government allocates fiscal 
transfers to counties directly (Luo 2003). As indicated by county-level data 
(excluding urban districts) on economic and fiscal conditions, Zhejiang has the 
highest GDP per capita among the provinces. Also, on average, its counties have 
larger net transfers per capita than many others in the same region. Apparently, the 
approach of "county managed by province" is conducive to the quality of 
compulsory education in Zhejiang. 
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Another point worth noting is the estimation result for Anhui, which sheds 
some light on the implementation of "tax-for-fee" reform. Anhui is the only province 
that experiments with the reform on a statewide basis during the year of our 
statistical analysis. The estimation result shows that a sizeable percentage of its 
counties have education spending lower than standard expenditure. The finding is in 
line with the concern that fiscal stress and under-provision of public services may not 
be addressed in the "tax-for-fee" reform. Though the change helps reduce the burden 
on rural population, the quantity and quality of public services have yet to be ensured. 
These estimation results on degree of provision raise issues pertaining to 
policy implementation. The noticeable variations in degree of provision across 
localities imply the need of better central-local and intra-provincial fiscal transfer 
arrangements to address the disparities. As suggested by the results observed in 
Anhui, a reform of education financing is needed in addition to the effort to alleviate 
burden on rural residents. The findings on Zhejiang's degree of provision take us to 
the issue of sub-national fiscal system. In fact, the subject of whether the existing 
number of tiers of intergovernmental fiscal relationship should be brought down has 
attracted attention. Reducing the tiers of relationship appears an option to promote 
the economic growth of counties and to strengthen their fiscal condition, which in 
turn would be favourable to the financing of local public goods and services. In a 
broader sense, the issue concerns the way in which the organization of jurisdictions 
enables more efficient and effective resource allocation and management so that the 
development and functioning of different tiers of administration could be facilitated^ 
17 An article in Beijing Review (Lan 2004) points out that the central government plans to simplify the 
sub-national administrative structure from four to three levels. 
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4.2 Regression results 
As presented in the previous section, the amount of investment made in 
education varies considerably across the nation. In the following, regression models 
are estimated to look at the factors that are linked to the variations in per-pupil 
education expenditure. The results of Equation (5) and (6) are shown in Table 8 and 
9. White's heteroskedasticity-robust estimator of variance is used so that consistent 
estimates of variances of the OLS estimates can be obtained. 
From the estimation, per-pupil education expenditure is higher in counties 
with higher GDP per capita {income). This is consistent with the expectation that 
better economic condition yields more financial resources and greater demand for 
quality which lead to larger investment in education. As for the effect of the share of 
GDP from the primary sector {agric\ both the linear and squared terms of the 
variable are not significant in the quadratic equation. The models are re-estimated 
with the squared term dropped but the linear term continues to be insignificant. 
However, in the double-logarithm specification, the coefficient of \vi{agric) is 
significant with the anticipated negative value. Conclusive result is yet to be drawn. 
Regarding the results on the share of population in school age {schage) and 
the school-age population density (pupden), both have negative coefficient. While 
pupden captures the scale effect, the finding on schage indicates that counties with 
bigger share of school-age population have lower per-pupil spending. A potential 
cause is the presence of fiscal constraint at the county level. Resources are not 
increased accordingly with the increased needs arising from the higher proportion of 
school-age population. 
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Turning to the dummy variables that characterize different county types, 
some of them exhibit insignificant coefficients. However, given that these localities 
are also the ones with lower density, pupden probably captures part of the picture. 
When pupden is not included in the estimation, positive coefficients are observed for 
all the dummies (Table 10 and 11). It indicates that, holding other factors constant,' 
educational resources vary with respect to geographical and demographic differences. 
Financial assistance from upper-tier governments helps offset partly the adverse 
effect of low income on the provision of education in poor localities. Comparisons 
among the various types of counties lead to the following salient findings. First, 
focusing on non-minority counties, hypothesis testing indicates that the coefficient of 
pmt (poor and mountainous counties) is not significantly different from that of ponly 
(solely poor counties). A possible inference is that financial help from higher-level 
governments is not enough to assist localities in coping with the disadvantages 
caused by economic as well as geographical constraints. Second, the coefficients of 
pmin (poor and minority), minmt (minority and mountainous) and pminmt (poor and 
minority and mountainous) are larger than those of the non-minority groups. 
Counties from these groups are more likely to face higher costs because of 
unfavourable physical conditions such as harsh climate and remoteness. At the same 
time, political factor plays a role. Minority regions are given preferential treatment 
under the central government's policy, e.g., they receive additional grants for 
education. The bigger positive coefficients associated with these dummy variables 
reflect cost factor and also the benign effect of national policy on education in these 
localities. 
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4.3 Education transfer estimation 
The empirical findings in the above sections give some support that a change 
in the current education financing arrangement would be desirable. As suggested by 
the regression results, a locality with lower income and larger share of population in 
school age faces constraints of resources for education. Although the results indicate 
that current financial assistance benefits counties with certain characteristics 
(mountainous, minority, poor), the finding that a considerable percentage of localities 
in the country spend less than the estimated standard expenditure points to the need 
of increased fiscal support from upper-tier governments. 
It is worth establishing an education transfer mechanism targeted on counties 
directly. By doing so, differences in costs of education and in abilities to finance 
education among localities are taken into account. As discussed in the chapter of 
literature review, there are various ways to allocate education funding. The choice of 
mechanism depends on the extent of equalization and the level of local contribution 
wanted. Also, it is affected by the financial capacity of upper-tier governments as 
well as political considerations. In our simulation of a potential education transfer 
arrangement in China, we follow the school aid formula called foundation program 
since the objective of this formula matches the current needs of the country. It 
assures that localities are able to invest a foundation amount (or guaranteed level) of 
educational resources as long as they put in the required effort. At the same time, 
they can spend above the guaranteed level upon their own decision. To recall,.the 
equation for our education transfer estimation is: 
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k 
where i = /th county, A： = 1 for primary education and 2 for junior secondary 
education, j = yth province, Ai = education transfers to counties, riki = the size of 
school-age population, SPREk = standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure, Cuj = 
educational price index, r* = national average share of GDP spent on compulsory 
education, = GDP 
The estimated size of education transfers and the percentage of counties 
receiving transfers are presented in Table 12. Under this mechanism, education 
transfers are allocated to 83 percent of counties in the western region, 68 percent and 
38 percent of those in the central and eastern regions. The total amount of funding 
involved is about $30 billion. The west receives the largest amount of transfers 
($13.9 billion). It is followed by the central region ($9.6 billion) and eastern region 
($6.0 billion). The size of transfers is influenced by the size of school-age population, 
and the gap between per-pupil price-adjusted standard expenditure and per-pupil 
fiscal capacity. With regard to individual provinces, transfers to the counties in 
Henan, Yunnan and Guangdong are biggest^^. As mentioned in the beginning of this 
study, there have been some intergovernmental transfers allocated for equalization 
purpose and some earmarked grants targeting at the implementation of compulsory 
education. In 2000, the size of transitional equalizing transfers (guoduxing zhuanyi 
zhifu) was $8.5 billion (Ministry of Finance 2000). During 1996-2000, the amount of 
earmarked grants for the project that assists poor regions in implementing 
The relatively large estimated transfers in the case of Guangdong may be somewhat unexpected. 
However, the presence of substantial differences in economic development among areas within the 
province means that there exist some localities that have weaker fiscal capability. Besides, Guangdong 
is a populous province. These are contributing factors to the size of estimated transfers. A limitation in 
the current analysis is that we could not establish a detailed price index to capture cost variations at 
the county level. This is worth further research when data permits. 
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compulsory education was $12.5 billion, in which $3.9 billion was contributed by the 
central government (Ministry of Finance 2001, 99). However, the results of pur 
estimation suggest that larger-scale financial support from the upper-tier 
governments is required in order to help localities meet standard expenditure. 
To further look at the extent of upper-tier governments' contribution under 
the proposed transfers option, we calculate F,, the share of education expenditure that 
is financed by the transfers: 
Ei 
where i = /th county,為=estimated education transfers, Et = actual total expenditure 
or price-adjusted standard total expenditure whichever is the higher. Among .the 
counties that are eligible for the funding, the ones in the western region have 46 
percent of their education expenditure financed by the transfers on average. The 
figures are 27 percent and 32 percent for the eastern and central counties (Table 13). 
Moreover, counties with lower income are provided with bigger transfers. There are 
cases that the education transfers support more than 50 percent of the education 
expenditure (last column in Table 13). This would be conducive to the reduction in 
fiscal pressure confronting the lower-tier governments. 
If such a transfer arrangement is to be implemented, additional issues need to 
be considered. First, the formula provides equalization up to the guaranteed level� 
Inequity occurs when localities spend above the guaranteed amount. High-income 
localities are able to finance each dollar of additional spending with less effort than 
low-income localities (Swanson and King 1997). Given that, it may be necessary to 
have other mechanisms to assist localities that are less wealthy but are willing to 
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invest extra resources in education. Another issue is how the central and provincial 
governments share the responsibility of providing the transfers. In Table 14，the 
estimated transfers are compared to the fiscal revenues^^ and tax rebates accrued to 
the provincial government for each province. It can be seen that in general the size of 
estimated transfers relative to fiscal revenues and tax rebates is larger in the central 
and western provinces, suggesting these provincial governments are likely to depend 
more on the assistance from the central government. Although an evaluation of the 
extent to which provincial governments are able to contribute to the education 
transfers requires detailed analysis of the overall expenditure needs of provincial 
governments and the fiscal relationship between provincial governments and other 
tiers of governments, it is reasonable to expect that the central government has a key 
role in putting up money for the transfers. 
The amount of funding involved in education transfers is undoubtedly 
sizeable. However, if there are suitable reforms of the current tax-sharing and 
transfer arrangements, it is possible to set up an education transfer system. Through 
the recent change in the sharing of enterprise and personal income tax, the central 
government is able to gather more revenue and it uses this increased revenue for 
transfers to the central and western regions (State Council 2001b). According to the 
Ministry of Finance (2004), the reform of enterprise and personal income tax sharing 
enabled the central government to increase the size of general equalizing transfers 
iyibanxing zhuanyi zhifu) to $37 billion in 2003. In addition, the central government 
allocated $30.5 billion to the intergovernmental transfers for the "tax-for-fee" reform. 
As reforms allow more fiscal revenue to be available for distribution that follows 
19 They do not include the intergovernmental remittances and subsidies. 
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equalization principle, it would become more feasible to appropriate substantial 
funding for an education transfer mechanism. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
The estimation results presented in this chapter paint a picture of the inter-
provincial and intra-provincial variations in education provision. They also show the 
relationship between per-pupil expenditure and a number of factors including GDP 
per capita, school-age population share, school-age population density and county 
characteristics. Based on an adapted school-aid formula, the size of transfers 
involved in facilitating localities to attain the standard expenditure level at a required 
effort level is estimated. 
From a regional perspective, variations in education provision are larger in 
the western and eastern regions. Though a smaller variation is found in the central 
region, the majority of counties in this region have low to intermediate degree of 
provision. Concerning individual provinces, intra-provincial variations are largest in 
several western and eastern provinces, namely Gansu, Jiangsu, Xinjiang, Xizang and 
Shandong. The findings observed in Zhejiang and Anhui highlight some of the policy 
and reform issues. 
Regression analysis shows that counties with weaker economy and larger 
share of population in school age are less able to guarantee the provision and the 
quality of education. Regarding the counties that have one or more of the following 
characteristics: mountainous, minority, and poor, the estimation results indicate the 
positive impact of financial assistance on education provision in these localities. 
Nevertheless, increased fiscal support from higher-level governments is needed 
53 
given the presence of shortfall in education expenditure in various parts of the 
country. 
The estimation of an education transfer mechanism is undertaken considering 
the inadequacy of present education financing arrangement. With the requirement 
that localities exert at least the average effort level observed in the country, the 
amount of transfers is estimated to be about $30 billion in order to help localities 
meet the standard expenditure levels. The western region gets the largest fiinding, but 
there is also considerable need for transfers in the eastern and central regions. 
Continuous reform of fiscal arrangement that allows more resources to be used for 
equalization purpose is essential for the establishment of a separate transfer system 




The financing of compulsory education in China has received much attention 
since it has been a demanding expenditure responsibility imposed on the lower-tier 
governments. This research seeks to provide a macro picture of the state of 
compulsory education in the rural part of China, and discusses a funding mechanism 
for supporting the provision of compulsory education. 
As reviewed in Chapter Two, many of the existing studies on the compulsory 
education in the country point out the various problems that localities have been 
facing with regard to education provision. In a few other studies, empirical analyses 
are conducted and they mainly focus on the disparities in education expenditure. 
However, research in other countries highlights the importance of adjusting for 
geographical differences in cost of provision. Actual expenditure does not only vary 
with quantity and quality; it is also affected by cost and efficiency. This leads us to 
analyse the issue of education finance in China from an alternative perspective. By 
establishing price-adjusted standard total expenditures and comparing them with.the' 
actual expenditures, we obtain a measure of degree of provision which gives an 
overview of the extent to which localities invest above or below the standard level. 
Another attempt made in this research is a simulation exercise on an 
education transfer arrangement for China. At present, the financing responsibility is 
mainly shouldered by lower-tier governments (counties and townships), and the 
fiscal abilities to support compulsory education differ across the country. Moreover, 
the launch of the "tax-for-fee" reform raises concerns about decrease in education 
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investment as education surcharges and self-raised funds are banned. Scholars and 
researchers have called for greater financial assistance from the upper-tier 
governments to education development. This research contributes to the discussion 
of setting up a separate transfer mechanism for compulsory education. The formula 
for calculating the education transfers is based on the school aid formula called 
foundation program in the United States. The mechanism has the advantage of 
guaranteeing a level of expenditure and requiring local commitment of resources at 
the same time. 
As shown in Chapter Four, there is a wide range of degree of provision. 
While some localities are able to make additional investment, some appear lacking in 
resources. Variations in the degree of provision are noticeably larger in a number of 
eastern and western provinces. Moreover, the results suggest that shortfall in 
education expenditure is not only found in the less developed western region. It also 
occurs in a considerable percentage of counties in the central and eastern regions. 
This indicates the importance of improved and expanded need-based transfers which 
channel funds to localities that are at a disadvantage. 
From the regression analysis, it is seen that various factors including 
economic factor, demographic characteristics, and county types have statistically 
significant relationship with per-pupil spending. Income exerts positive effect on 
education expenditure, whereas the impact of both the school-age population share 
and school-age population density are negative. Localities that belong to one or more 
categories, namely mountainous, minority and poor counties, have higher 
expenditure per pupil than ordinary counties holding other factors constant. In 
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particular, minority counties have bigger positive coefficients. The empirical findings 
indicate the following: First, lower level of economic development and larger share 
of population in school age limit the education resources available to students. 
Second, special needs stemming from certain county features (mountainous, minority, 
poor) are dealt with to some extent. 
There are additional results that are worth highlighting. Zhejiang exhibits a 
markedly different state of education provision. Few counties in the province 
encounter shortfall. In fact, most of its counties have relatively higher degree of 
provision. This brings forward the issues of simplified intergovernmental fiscal 
relations and jurisdictional reform as Zhejiang's "county managed by province" 
{sheng guan xian) approach appears to be a favourable arrangement. As for the result 
pertaining to Anhui, it shows that shortfalls in education expenditure exist while the 
province is experimenting with the "tax-for-fee" reform. This points to the 
importance of fiscal transfers on top of the "tax-for-fee" reform in order to provide 
necessary public services with reduced burden on rural households. 
Our results on the simulated education transfer mechanism suggest that the 
amount of funding involved is sizeable compared to the scale of existing transfers 
allocated for equalization purpose and those earmarked for basic education. Under 
the proposed arrangement, about 68 percent and 83 percent of the counties in the 
central and western regions are eligible for the financial assistance. The figure is 38 
percent for the eastern region. Further, each of the three regions has localities that are 
in need of comparatively large transfers. These suggest that ihstead of focusing on 
the western region, appropriate attention should also be given to the eastern and 
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central localities so as to ensure the provision of education and ameliorate fiscal 
stress on localities across the country. 
Despite the move to take account' of some crucial issues concerning .the 
analysis of education provision, this research faces limitations. First, the educational 
price index is affected by factors on top of involuntary cost variations, for example, 
qualifications of teachers, quality of other inputs, and governments' wage policy. 
Second, the price index can only be compiled at the provincial level rather than at the 
county level. Third, there are other factors that may cause differences in the cost of 
education provision but have yet to be taken into account. Fourth, a proxy for fiscal 
capacity instead of exact measures of tax base and effective tax rate is used in the 
computation of education transfers. 
Overall, this research is an exploratory attempt to analyse the issue of 
education finance in rural China by incorporating the concepts of standard needs and 
inter-area price differences, and to provide a quantitative discussion of an alternative 
education financing mechanism. The availability of more data would improve the 
estimation. For example, with further information about the composition of teachers 
and the wage policies in different localities, one can work on a better indicator of 
geographical wage differences. Other aspects that require more extensive analysis 
include the relationship between cost of provision and geographical features such as 
climate and density, the estimation of standard expenditure linking to quality targets, 
and the measurement of fiscal capacities. Continuous research on these areas has 
significant policy implications for the financing of compulsory education in China. 
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Box 1 Components of education expenditure 
I. Recurrent expenditure 
a) personnel components b) non-personnel components 
1. basic wage 1. general operation 
2. subsidies 2. supplies & materials 
3. other wage 3. equipment & facilities 
4. benefits 4. repair & maintenance 
5. social security 5. reception 
^ scholarships & grants ^ others 
• to students 
II. Infrastructure expenditure 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2a Unit prices for various expenditure categories (primary education) 
Province Dilapidated buildings repaired Desks & chairs purchased 
area spending unit price quantity spending unit price 
(Yuan per 
('OOP sq. km) ('OOP Yuan) sq. km) ('OOP sets) ('OOP Yuan) (Yuan per set) 
East 
Beijing 12 4743 395.3 11 1266 115.1 
Tianjin 4 1023 255.8 13 1137 87.5 
Hebei 239 43117 180.4 248 15533 62.6 
Liaoning 192 65920 343.3 64 4804 75.1 
Shanghai 20 40 6473 161.8 
Jiangsu 760 205977 271.0 226 16400 72.6 
Zhejiang 32 9657 301.8 62 4867 78.5 
Fujian 69 22205 321.8 97 6919 71.3 ' 
Shandong 125 13510 108.1 196 13290 67.8 
Guangdong 375 194184 517.8 408 33076 81.1 
Hainan 63 19910 316.0 42 3145 74.9 
Central 
Shanxi 211 38596 182.9 143 11831 82.7 
Jilin 112 34573 308.7 36 3712 103.1 
Heilongjiang 69 12924 187.3 37 3079 83.2 
Anhui 514 111090 216.1 242 12976 53.6 
Jiangxi 631 130223 206.4 137 8609 62.8 
Henan 530 100926 190.4 473 32961 69.7 
Hubei 213 41734 195.9 172 11936 69.4 
Hunan 283 63104 223.0 171 9365 54.8 
West 
Inner Mongolia 70 22258 318.0 69 5031 72.9 
Guangxi 410 77884 190.0 216 12940 59.9 
Sichuan 252 57489 228.1 244 17541 71.9 
Guizhou 184 49809 270.7 238 13267 55.7 
Yunnan 236 57674 244.4 213 15108 70.9 
Xizang 23 8311 361.3 18 2045 113.6 
Shaanxi 258 45308 175.6 117 9099 77.8 . 
Gansu 236 66026 279.8 137 11236 82.0 
Qinghai 32 13880 433.8 29 3122 107.7 
Ningxia 83 25311 305.0 32 2394 74.8 
Xinjiang 95 38972 410.2 74 6344 85.7 
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Tabic 2a (continued) 
Province Books purchased Teachers & Staff 
quantity spending unit price average wage 
COOO) ('OOP Yuan) (Yuan per book) (Yuan) 
East 
Beijing 391 2553 6.5 15884 
Tianjin 115 941 8.2 10194 
Hebei 5965 29328 4.9 6597 
Liaoning 689 4112 6.0 7704 
Shanghai 273 2831 10.4 17296 
Jiangsu 2408 14451 6.0 10371 
Zhejiang 918 8281 9.0 12507 
Fujian 672 3641 5.4 9976 
Shandong 3243 18377 5.7 7952 
Guangdong 4161 25944 6.2 10883 
Hainan 717 4205 5.9 8190 
Central 
Shanxi 1537 7900 5.1 5882 
Jilin 324 1890 5.8 6956 
Hcilongjiang 774 4185 5.4 8372 
Anhui 1362 7421 5.4 6517 
Jiangxi 1049 5078 4.8 6222 
Hcnan 5575 27205 4.9 7861 
Hubei 1475 7975 5.4 6515 
Hunan 4454 30628 6.9 7245 
West 
Inner Mongolia 1147 6720 5.9 6299 
Guangxi 2239 12966 5.8 5417 
Sichuan 2475 12162 4.9 6853 
Guizhou 2330 12525 5.4 5738 
Yunnan 1916 12052 6.3 8233 
Xizang 199 1510 7.6 12959 
Shaaaxi 1776 10370 5.8 5760 ‘ 
Gansu 1911 13522 7.1 7334 
Qinghai 768 5715 7.4 9876 
Ningxia 1482 10227 6.9 8256 
Xinjiang 986 6185 6.3 8694 
Source: data on quantity and spending are obtained from China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook 2001 ； 
average wage is obtained from China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2001 
Note: unit price is obtained from dividing spending by quantity 
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Table 2b Unit prices for various expenditure categories (junior secondary education) 
Province Dilapidated buildings repaired Desks & chairs purchased 
area spending unit price quantity spending unit price 
(Yuan per 
('OOP sq. km) ('OOP Yuan) sq. km) ('OOP sets) ('OOP Yuan) (Yuan per set) 
East 
Beijing 11 4082 371.1 19 1720 90.5 
Tianjin 1 85 85.0 11 817 74.3 
Hebei 116 23948 206.4 230 14614 63.5 
Liaoning 75 18851 251.3 73 5261 72.1 
Shanghai 20 12 1666 138.8 
Jiangsu 315 79734 253.1 143 10920 76.4 ‘ 
Zhejiang 8 3569 446.1 79 6272 79.4 
Fujian 29 7561 260.7 74 4753 64.2 
Shandong 113 11899 105.3 367 23440 63.9 
Guangdong 72 32482 451.1 156 14046 90.0 
Hainan 29 8466 291.9 19 2098 110.4 
Central 
Shanxi 104 17674 169.9 86 7079 82.3 
Jilin 34 12412 365.1 24 1925 80.2 
Heilongjiang 43 7141 166.1 33 2445 74.1 
Anhui 216 39626 183.5 185 11266 60.9 
Jiangxi 251 69704 277.7 107 6809 63.6 
Henan 202 40582 200.9 393 27509 70.0 
Hubei 143 29669 207.5 165 11104 67.3 
Hunan 124 30550 246.4 218 12404 56.9 
West 
Inner Mongolia 36 12324 342.3 35 2611 74.6 
Guangxi 119 18864 158.5 143 9340 65.3 . 
Sichuan 108 20529 190.1 200 14532 72.7 
Guizhou 29 6363 219.4 72 4208 58.4 
Yunnan 46 10343 224.8 111 8372 75.4 
Xizang 3 1390 463.3 2 232 116.0 
Shaanxi 81 14623 180.5 80 6352 79.4 
Gansu 66 20475 310.2 65 5349 82.3 
Qinghai 7 3280 468.6 9 826 91.8 
Ningxia 10 3065 306.5 11 896 81.5 
Xinjiang 36 13790 383.1 36 3440 95.6 
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Table 2b (continued) 
Province Books purchased Teachers & staff 
quantity spending unit price average wage 
(•000) ('OOP Yuan) (Yuan per book) (Yuan) 
East 
Beijing 212 1326 6.3 17946 
Tianjin 89 772 8.7 10931 
Hebei 3952 19219 4.9 7469 
Liaoning 305 3868 12.7 8742 
Shanghai 161 1985 12.3 18378 
Jiangsu 1464 11478 7.8 11561 
Zhejiang 552 3459 6.3 13561 
Fujian 327 2748 8.4 10645 
Shandong 3435 20787 6.1 9359 
Guangdong 1858 14635 7.9 12922 
Hainan 267 2057 7.7 8465 
Central 
Shanxi 868 5238 6.0 6636 
Jilin 187 1238 6.6 8081 
Heilongjiang 664 2809 4.2 9024 
Anhui 849 6774 8.0 7505 
Jiangxi 710 4941 7.0 7160 
Henan 3975 21812 5.5 6419 
Hubei 920 5927 6.4 7846 
Hunan 3412 25031 7.3 8464 
West 
Inner Mongolij 706 4335 6.1 7445 
Guangxi 1075 7309 6.8 6671 
Sichuan 1024 5577 5.4 7801 
Guizhou 699 5567 8.0 6610 
Yunnan 1168 8152 7.0 9404 
Xizang 69 594 8.6 14863 
Shaanxi 719 5348 7.4 7104 
Gansu 617 5370 8.7 8616 
Qinghai 137 1080 7.9 11510 
Ningxia 179 1380 7.7 8930 
Xinjiang 391 2644 6.8 
Source: data on quantity and spending are obtained from China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook 2001; 
average wage is obtained from China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2001 
Note: unit price is obtained from dividing spending by quantity 
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Table 3 Price ratios and wage ratios^  
Province Repair & maintenance Desks & chairs 
junior b junior b primary � , average primary � , average ^ ^ secondary ° r j secondary ^ 
East 
Beijing 1.58 1.59 1.59 1.62 1.28 1.45 
Tianjin 1.02 0.37 0.69 1.23 1.05 1.14 
Hebei 0.72 0.89 0.80 0.88 0.90 0.89 
Liaoning 1.37 1.08 1.23 1.06 1.02 1.04 
Shanghai ? 2.28 1.97 2.12 
Jiangsu 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.02 1.08 • 1.05 
Zhejiang 1.21 1.92 1.56 1.10 1.13 1.12 
Fujian 1.29 1.12 1.20 1.00 0.91 0.96 
Shandong 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.95 0.91 0.93 
Guangdong 2.07 1.94 2.00 1.14 1.28 1.21 
Hainan 1.26 1.25 1.26 1.05 1.57 1.31 
Central 
Shanxi 0.73 0.73 0.73 1.16 1.17 1.17 
Jilin 1.23 1.57 1.40 1.45 1.14 1.29 
Heilongjiang 0.75 0.71 0.73 1.17 1.05 1.11 
Anhui 0.86 0.79 0.83 0.75 0.86 0.81 
Jiangxi 0.82 1.19 1.01 0.88 0.90 0.89 
Henan 0.76 0.86 0.81 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Hubei 0.78 0.89 0.84 0.98 0.95 0.97 
Hunan 0.89 1.06 0.97 0.77 0.81 0.79 
West 
Inner Mongolia 1.27 1.47 1.37 1.03 1.06 ‘ 1.04 
Guangxi 0.76 0.68 0.72 0.84 0.93 0.88 
Sichuan 0.91 0.82 0.86 1.01 1.03 1.02 
Guizhou 1.08 0.94 1.01 0.78 0.83 0.81 
Yunnan 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.07 1.03 
Xizang 1.44 1.99 1.72 1.60 1.65 1.62 
Shaanxi 0.70 0.78 0.74 1.09 1.13 1.11 
Gansu 1.12 1.33 1.23 1.15 1.17 1.16 
Qinghai 1.73 2.01 1.87 1.51 1.30 1.41 
Ningxia 1.22 1.32 1.27 1.05 1.16 1.10 
Xinjiang 1.64 1.65 1.64 1.21 1.36 1.28 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Province Books Wage 
. junior b junior b primary •‘ , average primary •‘ , average secondary r secondary ® 
East 
Beijing 1.12 0.95 1.04 2.01 1.97 1.99 
Tianjin 1.40 1.32 1.36 1.29 1.20 1.24 
Hebei 0.84 0.74 0.79 0.84 0.82 0.83 
Liaoning 1.02 1.93 1.48 0.98 0.96 0.97 
Shanghai 1.78 1.88 1.83 2.19 2.01 2.10 
Jiangsu 1.03 1.19 1.11 1.31 1.27 1.29 
Zhejiang 1.55 0.96 1.25 1.58 1.49 1.53 
Fujian 0.93 1.28 1.11 1.26 1.17 1.21 
Shandong 0.97 0.92 0.95 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Guangdong 1.07 1.20 1.14 1.38 1.42 1.40 
Hainan 1.01 1.17 1.09 1.04 0.93 0.98 
Central 
Shanxi 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.75 0.73 0.74 
Jilin 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.88 0.89 0.88 
Heilongjiang 0.93 0.64 0.79 1.06 0.99 1.02 
Anhui 0.93 1.22 1.08 0.83 0.82 0.82 
Jiangxi 0.83 1.06 0.95 0.79 0.78 0.79 
Henan 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.00 0.70 0.85 
Hubei 0.93 0.98 0.95 0.83 0.86 0.84 
Hunan 1.18 1.12 1.15 0.92 0.93 0.92 
West 
Inner Mongolia 1.01 0.94 0.97 0.80 0.82 0.81 
Guangxi 0.99 1.04 1.01 0.69 0.73 0.71 
Sichuan 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.86 
Guizhou 0.92 1.21 1.07 0.73 0.72 0.73 
Yunnan 1.08 1.06 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.04 
Xizang 1.30 1.31 1.31 1.64 1.63 1.63 
Shaanxi 1.00 1.13 1.07 0.73 0.78 0.75 
Gansu 1.21 1.33 1.27 0.93 0.94 0.94 
Qinghai 1.28 1.20 1.24 1.25 1.26 1.26 
Ningxia 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.05 0.98 1.01 
Xinjiang 1.08 1.03 1.05 1.10 1.05 1.07 
Source: Table 2 
Note: a) price ratio is calculated as the ratio of provincial unit price to national average unit price; 
wage ratio is calculated as the ratio of provincial average wage to national average wage 
b) these ratios, which are the average for primary and junior secondary education, are used to 
compile the educational price index 
c) price ratio for maintenance and repair in Shanghai is not derived because data on the area 
of dilapidated buildings repaired is not available in the case of primary and junior 
secondary education. However, according to the data on secondary education (including 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 Price-adjusted standard per-pupil recurrent expenditure (in Yuan) 
province primary junior secondary  
East 
Beijing 953.5 1407.6 
Tianjin 735.6 1095.0 
Hebei 578.5 876.2 
Liaoning 678.0 1027.1 
Shanghai 990.3 1462.6 
Jiangsu 758.0 1131.0 
Zhejiang 835.3 1244.3 
Fujian 741.8 1110.2 
Shandong 656.3 973.3 
Guangdong 812.3 1219.0 
Hainan 687.5 1041.1 
Central 
Shanxi 528.7 806.7 
Jilin 644.0 985.1 
Heilongjiang 677.2 1010.5 
Anhui 578.9 877.7 
Jiangxi 569.8 870.4 
Henan 591.1 894.2 
Hubei 589.2 892.5 
Hunan 638.6 964.2 
West 
Inner Mongolia 601.7 925.2 
Guangxi 513.3 784.5 
Sichuan 600.3 908.5 
Guizhou 538.7 827.8 
Yunnan 697.9 1046.3 
Xizang 1052.8 1558.2 
Shaanxi 538.8 821.1 
Gansu 662.0 1005.0 
Qinghai 865.0 1303.4 
Ningxia 702.9 1062.1 
Xinjiang 757.0 1147.5 
Source: by estimation 
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Table 6 Summary statistics for degree of provision^ 
province average'' min median max cv ranking of cv*" 
East 
Beijing 2.88 2.28 2.98 4.24 0.25 24 
Tianjin 1.27 1.01 1.36 1.70 0.22 27 
Hebei 1.03 0.43 1.00 1.92 0.29 18 
Liaoning 1.18 0.51 1.16 2.27 0.31 14 
Shanghai 2.39 2.30 2.38 2.47 0.05 30 ‘ 
Jiangsu 1.33 0.55 1.48 3.90 0.55 2 
Zhejiang 1.89 0.97 1.78 2.93 0.26 20 
Fujian 1.23 0.75 1.30 2.06 0.25 22 
Shandong 1.15 0.51 1.06 2.57 0.47 5 
Guangdong 1.06 0.51 1.10 3.45 0.41 6 
Hainan 0.72 0.59 0.71 0.98 0.17 29 
Central 
Shanxi 1.09 0.52 1.13 2.41 0.27 19 
Jilin 1.16 0.80 1.26 3.19 0.32 13 
Heilongjiang 1.06 0.62 1.09 2.59 0.32 12 
Anhui 0.84 0.39 1.06 2.12 0.40 7 
Jiangxi 0.86 0.56 0.87 1.58 0.22 26 
Henan 0.72 0.43 0.74 1.61 0.30 17 
Hubei 0.97 0.52 0.99 2.09 0.31 15 
Hunan 1.00 0.61 1.01 1.80 0.21 28 
West 
Inner Mongolia 1.22 0.64 1.35 3.50 0.39 8 
Guangxi 1.01 0.59 1.07 1.93 0.25 23 
Sichuan 0.97 0.52 1.10 2.70 0.38 9 
Guizhou 0.70 0.36 0.75 1.43 0.26 21 
Yunnan 1.02 0.46 1.11 2.48 0.35 10 
Xizang 0.53 0.23 0.50 1.47 0.49 4 
Shaanxi 0.86 0.56 0.89 1.73 0.23 25 
Gansu 0.68 0.34 0.75 3.76 0.67 1 
Qinghai 0.74 0.28 0.79 1.34 0.31 16 
Ningxia 0.88 0.61 0.96 1.66 0.33 11 
Xinjiang \ M 0.59 1.19 3.92 0.49 3 
east 1.22 0.43 1.20 4.24 0.45 
central 0.90 0.39 0.98 3.19 0.33 
west 0.92 0.23 0.96 3.92 0.46 
Source: by estimation 
Note: a) degree of provision is a ratio of actual total expenditure to price-adjusted standard total expenditure 
b) average weighted by school-age population size 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8 Ordinaiy Least Squares Regression Results I 
(dependent variable: ln(per-pupil spending)) 
coefficient t-stat 
income 0.0709 ^ 
sqincome -0.0015 -4.63 
agric -0.0028 -1.43 
sqagric 0.0000 1.88 
schage -0.1361 -5.85 
sqschage 0.0024 3.77 
pupden -0.0041 -7.03 
sqpupden 0.0000 3.45 
mtonly -0.0176 -0.89 
minonly 0.1378 3.47 
ponly 0.0372 1.63 
pmin 0.1314 2.55 
pmt -0.0373 -1.58 
minmt 0.2479 6.77 
pminmt 0.2140 6.4 
sx 0.2508 7.33 
nmg 0.1576 2.75 
In 0.0059 0.13 
jl 0.1551 3.54 
hlj 0.1103 2.49 
js 0.5058 14.09 
zj 0.5310 13.74 
ah 0.2352 6.68 
g 0.4268 11.22 
jx 0.1347 4.23 
sd 0.2392 8.2 
hen 0.0348 1.21 
hub 0.1866 5.56 
hun 0.1931 7.06 
gd 0.5755 14.26 
gx -0.0323 -0.8 
hn -0.0051 -0.06 
sc 0.1873 5.7 
gz -0.1918 -4.6 
yn 0.2923 8.03 
xz 0.4406 5.41 
shaanxi 0.0180 0.52 
gs 0.1958 4.24 
qh 0.4856 6.65 
nx 0.2193 3.37 
xj 0.4325 6.91 
constant 8.0375 35.22 
adjusted R-squared 0.72 
no. of observations 1843 
Akaike information criterion 0.0587 
Schwarz 0.0666 
note: 
1. White's heteroskedasticity-robust estimator of variance is used 
2. The control province is Hebei 
3. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing are not included in the estimation 
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Table 9 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results II 
(dependent variable: ln(per-pupil spending) 
coefficient t-stat  
In(income) 0.2187 11.07 
In(agric) -0.0377 -2.12 
In(schage) -0.9090 -18.88 
In(pupden) -0.1416 -17.66 
mtonly -0.0458 -2.63 
minonly 0.0578 1.41 
ponly 0.0437 1.95 
pmin 0.1262 2.71 
pmt -0.0353 -1.57 
minmt 0.0906 2.92 
pminmt 0.1577 5.18 
sx 0.2452 7.57 
nmg 0.0149 0.27 
In 0.0668 1.49 
jl 0.1534 3.82 
hlj 0.0810 2.01 
js 0.5408 14.93 
zj 0.6334 17.14 
ah 0.2339 6.65 
g 0.5049 14.25 
jx 0.1474 4.81 
sd 0.2728 8.69 
hen 0.0155 0.53 
hub 0.2085 6.46 
hun 0.2285 8.62 
gd 0.6596 17.92 
gx 0.0609 1.51 
hn 0.1200 2 
sc 0.1699 5.52 
gz -0.0642 -1.64 
yn 0.3456 10.19 
xz 0.2629 3.12 
shaanxi 0.0079 0.23 
gs 0.1923 4.72 
qh 0.3449 5.45 
nx 0.3008 4.69 
xj 0.2673 5.07 
constant 9.4089 54.08 
adjusted R-squared 0.75 
no. of observations 1843 
Akaike information criterion 0.0517 
Schwarz 0.0579 
note: 
1. White's heteroskedasticity-robust estimator of variance is used 
2. The control province is Hebei 
3. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing are not included in the estimation 
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Table 10 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results III 
(dependent variable: ln(per-pupil spending)) 
coefficient t-stat 
income 0 0 ^ ^ 
sqincome -0.0017 -5.2 
agric -0.0008 -0.4 
sqagric 0.0000 1.2 
schage -0.1563 -6.75 
sqschage 0.0026 4.07 
mtonly 0.1007 6.1 
minonly 0.2473 6.01 
ponly 0.1073 4.26 
pmin 0.2508 4.58 
pmt 0.0882 3.9 
minmt 0.4270 12.68 
pminmt 0.3830 11.61 
sx 0.3800 11.17 
nmg 0.2801 4.81 
In 0.0995 2.3 
jl 0.2940 6.9 
hlj 0.2746 6.38 
js 0.4838 14.21 
zj 0.5387 15.16 
ah 0.2513 6.47 
f] 0.4787 13.11 
jx 0.2212 6.86 
sd 0.2071 6.98 
hen 0.0007 0.02 
hub 0.2255 6.79 
hun 0.2439 8.79 
gd 0.6266 16.73 
gx 0.0184 0.44 
hn 0.0720 0.76 
sc 0.2197 6.26 
gz -0.1609 -3.8 
yn 0.3490 9.28 
xz 0.5939 7.4 
shaanxi 0.1504 4.31 
gs 0.3159 6.61 
qh 0.5921 7.88 
nx 0.3211 5.12 
xj 0.6182 10.17 
constant 7.9784 34.84 
adjusted R-squared 0.70 
no. of observations 1843 
Akaike information criterion 0.0629 
Schwarz 0.0709 
note: 
1. White's heteroskedasticity-robust estimator of variance is used 
2. The control province is Hebei 
3. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing are not included in the estimation 
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Table 11 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results IV 
(dependent variable: ln(per-pupil spending) 
coefficient t-stat 
In(income) 0.2595 11.39 
In(agric) 0.0199 0.94 
In(schage) -1.1104 -22.12 
mtonly 0.0895 5.46 
minonly 0.2333 5.65 
ponly 0.1218 4.74 
pmin 0.2612 4.81 
pmt 0.0999 4.35 
minmt 0.4199 12.42 
pminmt 0.4135 12.09 
sx 0.3933 11.4 
nmg 0.2987 5.04 
In 0.1318 2.99 
jl 0.3007 7.01 
hlj 0.3010 6.9 
js 0.5040 14.58 
zj 0.6091 17.85 
ah 0.2432 6.38 
g 0.5122 14.34 
jx 0.2135 6.61 
sd 0.2219 7.13 
hen -0.0065 -0.21 
hub 0.2193 6.42 
hun 0.2379 8.51 
gd 0.6540 17.92 
gx 0.0308 0.71 
hn 0.1064 1.22 
sc 0.2387 6.84 
gz -0.1061 -2.57 
yn 0.3728 9.94 
xz 0.6528 7.87 
shaanxi 0.1678 4.61 
gs 0.3762 8.16 
qh 0.6327 8.14 
nx 0.3500 5.5 
xj 0.6589 11.42 
constant 9.0877 44.95 
adjusted R-squared 0.69 
no. of observations 1843 
Akaike information criterion 0.0635 
Schwarz 0.0710 
note: 
1. White's heteroskedasticity-robust estimator of variance is used 
2. The control province is Hebei 
3. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing are not included in the estimation 
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Table 12 Summary of estimated education transfers 
% of counties 
receiving 
province total transfers transfers 
(in million yuan) 
East 
Beijing 0.0 0.0 
Tianjin 0.0 0.0 ’ 
Hebei 451.8 38.4 
Liaoning 436.2 36.4 
Shanghai 0.0 0.0 
Jiangsu 1392.2 31.7 
Zhejiang 36.2 4.8 
Fujian 308.1 52.0 
Shandong 1029.7 34.8 
Guangdong 2211.1 65.8 
Hainan 176.4 100.0 
Central 
Shanxi 778.0 75.5 
Jilin 202.2 45.7 
Heilongjiang 619.9 62.1 
Anhui 1874.0 65.0 
Jiangxi 1174.0 83.3 
Henan 2687.2 63.9 
Hubei 892.0 60.7 
Hunan 1388.3 73.6 
West 
Inner Mongolia 345.9 48.6 
Guangxi 1032.2 68.0 
Sichuan 2116.6 74.8 
Guizhou 1752.6 95.7 
Yunnan 2536.5 89.2 
Xizang 425.1 98.6 
Shaanxi 1176.7 87.1 
Gansu 1825.4 92.5 
Qinghai 464.5 100.0 
Ningxia 335.0 88.2 
Xinjiang 1190.2 ^  
east 6041.6 38.4 
central 9615.6 68.3 
west 13900.0 82.7 
overall 29557.2 66.1 
Source: by estimation 
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Table 13 Percentage of education expenditure funded by transfers 
% of education expenditure 
province provided by transfers 




Hebei 16.74 0.11 14.30 44.65 
Liaoning 39.94 5.45 33.89 71.13 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 35.48 2.65 38.72 58.28 
Zhejiang 21.12 17.51 18.98 26.85 
Fujian 19.56 0.06 18.20 48.72 
Shandong 26.74 1.42 20.91 64.80 
Guangdong 29.76 0.89 28.39 69.26 
Hainan 39.01 4.19 39.43 61.65 
Central 
Shanxi 36.35 0.40 37.68 81.89 
Jilin 20.90 2.08 18.77 46.73 
Heilongjiang 34.20 0.69 34.33 61.59 
Anhui 33.97 2.45 36.59 66.06 
Jiangxi 30.61 0.08 32.00 72.03 
Henan 33.15 0.43 34.10 56.51 
Hubei 30.00 0.93 27.55 65.05 
Hunan 28.85 0.11 25.14 71.48 
West 
Inner Mongolia 22.76 0.23 22.63 59.32 
Guangxi 31.14 0.41 32.14 69.50 
Sichuan 36.44 1.46 35.18 71.11 
Guizhou 54.23 6.89 60.63 79.16 
Yunnan 47.96 3.38 49.01 82.41 
Xizang 62.22 20.17 64.64 79.00 
Shaanxi 40.82 0.90 39.90 85.65 
Gansu 58.89 2.24 70.63 85.52 
Qinghai 62.97 25.91 66.14 80.77 
Ningxia 43.99 1.88 46.49 80.91 
Xinjiang 41.80 0.08 47.94 84.51 
east 26.69 0.06 24.99 71.13 
central 32.02 0.08 32.29 81.89 
west 45.68 0.08 48.81 85.65 
overall 38.27 0.06 37.42 85.65 
source: by estimation ‘ 
note: counties in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai do not receive transfers under this transfer mechanism 
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Table 14 Estimated transfers as a share of fiscal revenues & tax rebates at provincial governments 
provincial governments' estimated tranfers as a 
fiscal revenues & tax share of provincial 
rebates governments' fiscal 
(in million Yuan) revenues & tax rebates (%) 
province 
East 
Beijing 21948.7 0.0 
Tianjin 10901.4 0.0 
Hebei 9064.8 5.0 
Liaoning 3689.5 11.8 
Shanghai 38242.5 0.0 
Jiangsu 5739.9 24.3 
Zhejiang 6516.9 0.6 
Fujian 4831.6 6.4 
Shandong 6888.0 14.9 
Guangdong 27927.8 7.9 
Hainan 1261.6 14.0 
Central 
Shanxi 3460.3 22.5 
Jilin 2512.3 8.0 
Heilongjiang 6706.8 9.2 
Anhui 2690.0 69.7 
Jiangxi 2566.5 45.7 
Henan 5897.2 45.6 
Hubei 2509.7 35.5 
Hunan 6458.7 21.5 
West 
Inner Mongolia 2169.0 15.9 
Guangxi 3532.3 29.2 
Sichuan 7483.2 28.3 
Guizhou 2971.8 59.0 
Yunnan 11320.1 22.4 
Xizang 140.1 303.4 
Shaanxi 3087.1 38.1 
Gansu 3141.3 58.1 
Qinghai 737.2 63.0 
Ningxia 1050.6 31.9 
Xinjiang 1298.4 91.7 
source: the calculation of provincial governments' fiscal revenues & tax rebates uses data from 
Zhongguo caizheng nianjian 2001 (China's Finance Yearbook 2001) and 
Quanguo dishixian caizheng tongji ziliao 2000 (China Sub-provincial Finance Statistics 2000) 
note: 1 • the fiscal revenues do not include the intergovernmental remittances and subsidies 
2. counties in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai do not receive transfers under this transfer mechanism 
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